Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Case Study in Pragmatic Judicial Reconstruction by Selmi, Michael
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2008 
Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Case Study in 
Pragmatic Judicial Reconstruction 
Michael Selmi 
George Washington University Law School, mselmi@law.gwu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Case Study in Pragmatic Judicial 
Reconstruction, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 522 (2008). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
INTERPRETING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:  
 
A CASE STUDY IN PRAGMATIC JUDICIAL RECONSTRUCTION 
 
MICHAEL SELMI*   
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
 
When the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) was enacted 
in 1990, it was hailed as an emancipation proclamation for the disabled.1  
Passed with overwhelming majorities in both houses of Congress,2 the 
employment provisions of the Act were intended to open up job 
opportunities for the disabled so as to integrate them into the workplace.  
To increase access to the workplace, the statute not only prohibits 
discrimination but it requires employers to provide reasonable 
accommodations to the disabled, and to the extent the employment 
provisions of the statute generated any significant controversy during the 
congressional deliberations it was over the potential costs associated with 
the accommodation provision.3   
 
 Fifteen years after its enactment, the experience under the statute 
has been quite different from what its advocates had expected, and likely 
from what its critics feared.  Recent studies suggest that the employment 
levels of the disabled may have decreased since the passage of the Act.4  
                                                 
     *  Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.  An earlier version 
of this paper was presented at a symposium on the foundations of the Americans With 
Disabilities Act held at New York University Law School, and at a faculty workshop at 
Boston University Law School.  At both, I greatly benefited by comments I received from 
the participants.  I have also received helpful comments from Naomi Cahn, Kris Collins, 
Charlie Craver, John Duffy, Rafael Gely, David Lyons, Larry Mitchell and Michael Stein, 
as well as helpful research assistance from Kate Haskell and Pereepa Joann Moolsingtong. 
     1  See Edmund Newton, Disabled: The Battle Goes On, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1990, at 
E1 (describing the statute as “an ‘emancipation proclamation’ for 43 million disabled 
Americans”).   The language is attributed to Senators Harkin and Kennedy.  See 136 
Cong. Rec. S9689, daily ed., July 13, 1990. 
     2   The bill that became the ADA was passed by a vote of 377-28 in the House and 91-
6 in the Senate. 
     3   As one example, coverage in the Wall Street Journal concentrated exclusively on 
the potential costs of the legislation, as well as its “astonishingly brief journey through 
the Washington process.”  Albert R. Karr, Rights Bill for Disabled Seems Headed for 
Unusually Smooth, Quick Passage, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 1989, at A1; see also Jeanne 
Saddler, Small Firms Lobby to Revise Bill Helping the Disabled: Business Fear the Cost 
of Changes They Might Be Required to Make, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1990, at B2 
(emphasizing potential costs to small businesses); Albert R. Karr, Disabled-Rights Bill 
Inspires Hope, Fear, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1990, at B1 (“Some employers are worried 
about whom they may have to hire, but much of the opposition boils down to money.”).   
     4  See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment 
Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. OF POL. ECON. 915 
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Several studies have also documented extremely low success rates among 
disability discrimination complaints filed in federal court.5  Part of the low 
success rate is attributable to a series of Supreme Court decisions that have 
sharply limited the scope of the statute. 6   Yet, contrary to original 
expectations, the accommodation provision of the statute has generated 
relatively little litigation or controversy.7  Instead, much of the litigation 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2001);  Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Emplyment Effects of the Americans With 
Disabilities Act, 35 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 693 (2000).  Although the employment data 
are only tangentially related to this article, they have generated a considerable amount of 
controversy, so let me note that in addition to the flaws highlighted by others, these 
studies seem limited due to their lack of an explanatory theory.  To suggest that the law 
has hurt those it was intended to help implies that there was a group of individuals, who 
required expensive accommodations, who previously obtained jobs that are no longer 
available to them.   But if some employers have stopped hiring individuals for fear of the 
cost of accommodations, it leaves open the question how those individuals were 
obtaining jobs previously.  Perhaps employers are more willing to provide 
accommodations voluntarily without the threat of legal sanctions, but just as plausibly, 
something is amiss with the story that is being told in the decline of employment, and that 
may be a poor analysis of the data.  For two critiques of the economic studies see Peter 
Blanck et al., Calibrating the Impact of the ADA’s Employment Provisions, 14 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 267 (2003) and  Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Reduced Employment for People With Disabilities? 25 BERK. J. OF EMP. 
& LABOR LAW 528 (2004) (review essay).  For a thorough discussion of the data sets and 
their limitations see Richard K. Burkhauser et al., Self-Reported Work Limitation Data: 
What They Can and Cannot Tell Us, 39 DEMOGRAPHY 541 (2002).    
     5   Ruth Colker authored two articles, based on published court decisions, 
demonstrating the limited success of plaintiffs in disabilities cases, which she later 
incorporated into a book.  See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act – A 
Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV.LIB. L. REV. 99 (1999); RUTH 
COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT 69-95 (2005).  Colker’s findings were largely replicated by two studies 
sponsored by the American Bar Association.  See Study Finds Employer Wins Most ADA 
Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. 
REP. 403 (1998); John W. Parry, Employment Decisions Under ADA Title I B Survey 
Update, 23 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 290 (1999).  While the limits of 
relying on published opinions for empirical work are well known, no one has disputed the 
low success rate of disabilities claims, although it certainly may not be as low as the 
studies indicate.       
     6   The cases are discussed in section III, infra, and the cases most frequently cited as 
part of a judicial backlash are Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999); 
Albertson’s v. Kirkinburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 
U.S. 516 (1999); Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Chevron v. 
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002).  In addition, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 
(2002), is also frequently criticized by commentators, but that case involves the issue of 
accommodation – specifically when an employer must override a seniority system to 
accommodate a disabled worker – and will not be discussed in this article.    
     7    Courts have split over the proper legal standard to define an unreasonable 
accommodation with the dispute centering primarily on who has the burden of 
establishing what is reasonable.  Cf. Vande Zande v. State of Wisconsin, 44 F.3d 538 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (adopting a cost-benefit approach) and Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 
63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting cost-benefit analysis and emphasizing employer’s 
burden).   Although the Vande Zande case has received considerable attention, in part 
because it was written by Judge Posner, the more plaintiff-friendly Borkowski standard 
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has focused on the preliminary statutory definition of who is disabled, a 
question courts have generally answered in a restrictive fashion.   
 
 Explaining this unusual turn of events is a complicated task.  
Within the academic literature, a consensus has emerged that the ADA has 
been the subject of a judicial backlash against the disabled, either because 
the Supreme Court is unsympathetic to their plight or as a means of 
restricting the statute’s potential costs.  Professor Matthew Diller explains:  
“The term ‘backlash’ suggests a hostility to the ADA and toward those 
who seek to enforce it.  The backlash thesis suggests that judges are not 
simply confused by the ADA; rather, they are resistant to it.  It suggests 
that the courts are systematically nullifying rights that Congress conferred 
on people with disabilities.”8  A cottage industry of scholarship has arisen 
around the judicial backlash theme to emphase the Court’s narrow 
statutory interpretations and how the decisions deviate from Congressional 
intent.9   
 
 In this article, I will offer an alternative story.  While it is true that 
the Supreme Court has read the ADA narrowly, and in a manner that is 
generally inconsistent with congressional intent, I will contend that it is 
wrong to attribute that narrow interpretation to a judicial backlash.   My 
thesis is that the Supreme Court has generally interpreted the statute 
consistent with congressional expectations even as it has deviated from 
those expectations as expressed in the statutory language, and more 
specifically in the legislative history.  As discussed in more detail shortly, 
the overwhelming Congressional support for the statute obscured a broad 
Congressional indifference to the specifics of the legislation – Congress 
had a general intent to provide protection to the disabled without imposing 
excessive costs on employers.  Beyond those general principles, Congress 
                                                                                                                                                 
has drawn more adherents among circuit courts.  See Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 
F.3d 254 (1st Cir. 2001) (discussing cases). 
     8  Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 22 (2000) (footnote omitted).  Diller’s article was part 
of a symposium on the backlash thesis, and those articles were later collected in 
BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS (L. Krieger ed. 
2003). 
    9 In addition to the sources cited above see, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf, “Substantially 
Limited” Protection from Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model & 
Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 539-44 (1997); 
Chai Feldblum, Definition of Disabled Under Federal Antidiscrimination Law: What 
Happened? Why? And What We Can Do About It?  21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91 
(2000); Rebecca Hammer White, Deference and Disabling Discrimination, 99 MICH. L. 
REV. 532 (2002); Aviam Soifer,  The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative 
Capability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1279, 1304-06 (2000); Michael Ashley Stein, Same 
Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 579 (2004). Other examples of articles critiquing the Supreme Court 
decisions will be cited throughout this article. 
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had few if any specific intentions, and the Supreme Court has effectively 
filled in the statute based on its own preferences, both ideologically and 
institutionally, as guided by reigning social norms.  The statute the Court 
has constructed is not a bad statute, but it is certainly not the statute 
Congress passed.  At the same time, it appears that the current Congress 
may prefer the Court’s reconstruction to the statute it originally enacted 
given that it has not sought to overturn any of the Court’s decisions.10   
 
 The attraction of the backlash thesis is understandable because it is 
a relatively simple story that feeds into the pervasive notion among 
academics that the Court has interpreted the statute consistent with its own 
conservative political preferences.  But that story is too simple, as 
reflected in the important fact that most of the restrictive interpretations 
have been the product of a unanimous Supreme Court.11  Indeed, a closer 
look at some basic facts reveals the inadequacy of a simple story and why 
the ADA poses a unique challenge for explanatory theories.  When it 
comes to the ADA, we have a statute that was passed with virtually 
unanimous support in both houses of Congress, with the strong support of 
a Republican President as well as broad public support,12 which has been 
rewritten in a restrictive fashion by a near unanimous Supreme Court 
without any subsequent efforts to overturn those decisions.  That sequence 
of events is not easy to explain, and as will become clear, the Court’s 
decisions cannot be rationalized against any principled means of statutory 
interpretation.13                 .           
 
 As discussed in more detail below, the passage of the ADA, like its 
predecessor the Rehabilitation Act (“Rehab Act”), occurred through rather 
curious means.  The statute was shepherded through Congress without 
significant controversy by a group of Congressional legislators all of 
whom had personal experience with disabilities, either in their own lives 
                                                 
     10   One indication of this preference is that there has been no movement within 
Congress to amend the ADA, even though many of what are generally considered the 
Court’s most pernicious decisions, such as Sutton v. United Airlines could readily be 
nullified by simple legislative action.  The Sutton case, which involved the important 
question of whether in defining disability an individual should be evaluated taking into 
account any available mitigation measures, is discussed further in section III, infra.   
     11  The Court’s most criticized decision, Sutton v. United Airlines, was a 7-2 decision, 
with Justice Stevens and Breyer in dissent.  All of the other cases that are typically 
associated with the backlash thesis  were unanimous decisions.     
     12  Public opinion polls have long shown extremely high support for the ADA and the 
rights of the disabled more generally.  For example, in 1991, 95% of those surveyed 
supported a prohibition on discrimination based on disability, and 83% supported 
requiring employers to provide accommodations.  See Survey conducted by Louis Harris 
Associates, May 15-June 18, 1991, for the National Organization on Disability (available 
at www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi).  The support has been consistent over time.  See 
Elaine B. Sharp, The Dynamics of Issue Expansion: Cases From Disability Rights and 
Fetal Research Controversy, 56 J. OF POLITICS 919, 933 (1994) (discussing early polls 
and strong support for affirmative action measures).      
     13  See section IV, infra. 
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or with relatives, and the statute was enacted without the presence or aid 
of a substantial social movement. 14   As a result, Congress passed an 
extremely broad statute, modeled after the Rehab Act, and then turned 
over its particulars to agencies and interest groups.  And here is where the 
problems began.  Rather than push for narrow legislation that would have 
protected the individuals Congress principally had in mind, the interest 
groups, along with interested Congressional staff, opted for broad 
statutory language that could have incorporated a much larger group of 
individuals into the statute’s scope  – most of whom no one would have 
considered disabled prior to the passage of the Act.  It could be argued that 
this is what legislation is intended to do, create protections for those who 
were otherwise invisible, but the individuals I am referring to – those who 
wear glasses, sustain workplace injuries, or are allergic to perfume – were 
never intended to be the subject of the legislation and there seems little 
public support for extending statutory protections to those individuals.  
Significantly, most of the restrictive statutory interpretations have arisen in 
cases involving non-traditional disabilities.15 
 
 A predictable result of the Supreme Court’s narrow statutory 
construction  designed to eliminate those unintended, and often frivolous 
claims, is that the Court also carved out a whole class of individuals who 
were intended to be covered by the statute, namely those whose 
disabilities can be controlled with medication, including those with 
epilepsy and depression, among others. 16    While these decisions are 
problematic and contrary to the intent of the statute, I do not agree that 
they are the result of a backlash against those with disabilities.  In fact, the 
Supreme Court, and lower courts have both been reasonably protective of 
                                                 
     14  This issue is discussed in detail in section IV, infra. 
     15  See Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (myopia); Toyota Motor Mfg. v. 
Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (work-related carpal tunnel syndrome); Murphy v. United 
Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (hypertension); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 
391 (2002) (bad back); Chevron v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (hepatitis C).  Another 
case decided at the same time as Sutton involved an individual who only had vision in 
one eye, which would likely be considered a traditional disability although he was able to 
self-correct to improve his vision.  See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 
(1999).   
     16  See, e.g., Nese v. Julian Nordic Const. Co., 405 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff’s 
epilepsy was controlled by medication and therefore he was not disabled); Ristrom v. 
Asbestos Workers Local 34, 370 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 2004) (individual’s treatable 
depression did not qualify as disability); Doyal v. Oklahoma Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492 
(10th Cir. 2000) (same); Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, 297 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2002) (diabetic 
not disabled).  Many courts, however, have analyzed the particular circumstances to 
determine whether, even with mitigating measures, the plaintiff is disabled and have 
frequently found that the plaintiff was still limited in a major life activity, under the terms 
of the statute.  See Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 
2001) (epilepsy constitutes a disability); Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (diabetic substantially limited and therefore disabled); Head v. Glacier 
Northwest, Inc., 413 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2005) (individual’s depression interfered with 
sleep thus qualifying him as disabled).    
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individuals with traditional disabilities 17  – it is only the attempted 
expansion of the definition of disability that has been rejected.  But as just 
noted, that rejection was entirely predictable.  Without broad public 
support, without a strong social movement pushing to expand our notion 
of disabilities, it was simply too much to expect the Supreme Court to 
interpret the ADA expansively, or even to construe the statute consistent 
with congressional intent so long as the statute provided interpretive room 
for judicial discretion, which it did.   
 
 In this article, I will first explore the history of disability rights 
legislation to describe Congress’ general indifference to the substance of 
the ADA, and to explain that many of the controversies that have arisen 
over the ADA were also present with the Rehab Act.  I will then analyze 
several of the Supreme Court decisions that have restricted the scope of 
the statute to again show that the Court’s actions were predictable and 
consistent with existing social norms relating to our perceptions of the 
disabled.  In the final section, I will draw several lessons from the ADA 
case study, including how the decisions cannot be justified based on any 
principled theory of interpretation but might be better understood against 
the backdrop of positive political theory in which the Supreme Court is 
seen as a strategic actor seeking to impose its own preferences, only in this 
instance the Court appeared primarily concerned with institutional rather 
than political preferences.  Finally, I will suggest that the absence of an 
effective social movement has severely limited the success of the statute, 
and has solidified the Court’s interpretations since Congress has faced no 
significant pressure to overturn the decisions.                  
 
II. TOWARDS THE PASSAGE OF THE ADA. 
 
Although the ADA is the latest statutory manifestation of 
governmental prohibitions on discrimination against those with disabilities, 
disability issues have long been on the governmental agenda.  Social 
security provides payments to those who are disabled and unable to work, 
and beginning in the 1950s there have been concerted efforts to integrate 
the disabled both into the workplace and society more generally.18  Those 
efforts have varied over time, as have social attitudes towards the disabled, 
but it is important to stress that issues relating to the disabled have a long 
                                                 
     17  See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (finding asymptomatic HIV-positive 
individual covered by ADA).  Another case, this one more surprising, in which the Court 
offered broad protection was Cleveland v. Policy Mgt. Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795 
(1999), where the Court held that an individual could pursue an ADA discrimination 
claim even while receiving disability social security benefits because the two statutes had 
different definitions of disability.  
     18   For discussions of how the ADA fits within other disability schemes see Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1 (2004) and Richard V. 
Burkhauser & Mary C. Daly, U.S. Disability Policy in a Changing Environment, 16 J. OF 
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 213 (2002). 
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and complex history even while the comprehensive antidiscrimination 
protections are relatively new.  In addition, disability issues are implicated 
in a variety of statutory schemes, including workers’ compensation, the 
Family and Medical Leave Act, as well as social security. schemes.  In 
other words, the ADA forms one part of a complex regulatory scheme.         
 
Before exploring the evolution of the ADA, it is important to 
highlight two fundamental issues that define and differentiate 
antidiscrimination protection for the disabled compared to other 
antidiscrimination mandates.  First, unlike race, gender or age where the 
protected class is reasonably well defined, the ADA begins with a 
threshold question of who qualifies as disabled.  As discussed in detail in 
the next section, defining disability has proved to be the most difficult 
judicial task and has, in turn, led to most of the controversial decisions.  
Both the ADA, and its predecessor statute the Rehab Act, rely on an 
unusual definition of disability, one that defines the disabled as an 
individual who has “a substantial limitation on a major life activity.”19  
The statutes also provide protection for those who are “regarded as” 
disabled.20  These definitions are quintessentially legal in nature, requiring 
interpretation of virtually every term without clear social norms to help 
guide those determinations.  In general, there is a core notion of disability 
for which a broad consensus exists, a category that is often defined as 
traditional disabilities, but once we move beyond that core, there appears 
to be little consensus regarding who ought to be defined as disabled.  
Relatedly, the very heterogeneity of disability poses difficult interpretive 
and statutory problems.  Disability can be permanent or temporary, it can 
arise at birth or from work-related incidents or other accidents, or develop 
later in life; some disabilities are visible, while many are not and different 
conditions affect individuals differently so what might be disabling in one 
person may not be to another.  Together these factors complicate both the 
very notion of disability and statutory enforcement efforts.      
 
There is another important way in which the issue of disability 
rights is distinct from most other antidiscrimination workplace mandates.  
For many, having a disability means having differential abilities that may 
render one less capable of performing certain jobs or functions unless the 
employer provides an accommodation.  This is certainly not true of all 
disabilities but it is a background assumption underlying the need to 
provide accommodations to the disabled.21  Although a rich literature has 
                                                 
     19  42 U.S. C. § 12102(2). 
     20  Id. 
     21  It should be noted that within the disability rights movement, the need for an 
accommodation is often seen as a social construct, that society has been constructed 
around a limited norm of ability.  See, e.g., Kay Schriner & Richard K. Scotch, A Human 
Variation perspective on Overcoming Oppression, 12 J. OF DISABILITY POL’Y STUDIES 
100, 100 (2001) (“One key rationale for the ADA was that many of the problems 
associated with having a disability were not inevitable products of impairment, but rather 
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developed over the accommodation mandate contained in the ADA, in 
particular how that mandate is similar to other mandates contained in 
antidiscrimination statutes,22 there is little question a public perception 
exists that disability accommodations are both necessary and potentially 
costly.  Indeed, the public debate on the ADA focused almost exclusively 
on the costs of accommodation, rather than on the more important 
threshold question of who will qualify as disabled.23       
 
These two differences – the need to define the class and the 
accommodation requirement – obviously run together.  The broader the 
class, the greater the accommodation burden will be.  It is also possible 
that the broader the class becomes, the less force the antidiscrimination 
mandate will have, particularly if the class is stretched to include 
individuals society would not otherwise identify as disabled.  Relatedly, an 
expansive class may diminish support for the accommodation mandate, 
especially if employers are asked to provide costly accommodations for all 
manner of health conditions.  So although the issues of definition and 
                                                                                                                                                 
were the result of a socially constructed environment that arbitrarily and perniciously 
excluded or limited social participation.”).  Given that the statute includes an 
accommodation requirement as well as means for employers to avoid having to 
accommodate some disabilities, it is not clear that it is accurate to say that this concern 
motivated the ADA.  Nevertheless, there is no question that within the disability 
community, this was one of the intended purposes, and one that the statute has likely not 
influenced, as discussed in more detail in section IV.  For an extended treatment of the 
social model see Ravi A. Malhotra, The Legal Politics of Globalization and Workers 
With Disabilities in Canada and the United States (dissertation on file with the author).   
     22  See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Rational Discrimination, Accommodation, and the 
Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003); Seth D. Harris, Law, 
Economics, and Accommodations In the Internal Labor Market, New York Law School 
Public Law and Legal Theory paper 05/06, 13 (2006, available on ssrn.com); Mark 
Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833 (2001); Christine 
Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000); Christine Jolls, 
Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001); Samuel 
Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination With a Difference: Can Employment 
Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans With Disabilities Act?  79 N.C. L. REV. 
307 (2001); Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and 
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1 (1996); Michael A. Stein, Same Struggle, 
Same Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 
(2004); Michael A. Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53 
DUKE L.J. 79 92003); J.H. Verkerke, Disaggregating Antidiscrimination and 
Accommodation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1385 (2003).  
     23  This was apparent in the major newspaper coverage of the statute, almost all of 
which focused on the potential cost of accommodation, often in the area of public 
services.  See note 3 supra.  To the extent there was any discussion regarding the 
potential breadth of the statute, it involved the incorporation of AIDs into the definition 
of disability.  For a sampling of the newspaper coverage see Susan F. Rasky, How the 
Disabled Sold Congress on a New Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1989, at D5; 
Marlene Cimons, Far-Reaching Bill to Protect Disabled from Discrimination Gains 
Speed, L.A. TIMES,  July 30, 1989, at A6; Steven A. Holmes, Rights Bill Sent to Bush, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1990, at A6; Sharon LaFraniere, Doors Opening for the Disabled, 
WASH. POST, May 25, 1990.   
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accommodation are typically treated as distinct, they are closely related 
and over the last decade the Court has expressed a strong interest in the 
definition of disability without devoting substantial time to the potential 
costs of accommodation.24  With those background presumptions in mind, 
I will now explore the origins of the federal statutes relating to disability 
in the workplace.      
 
A. The Passage of the Rehab Act.             
 
Both the Rehab Act and the ADA were passed by Congress under 
unusual circumstances.  Both acts received widespread support within 
Congress – the ADA passed with overwhelming majorities in both houses 
– despite serious opposition from the business lobby.  This was true even 
though at the time the Rehab Act was passed in 1973, the disability 
community formed only a loose advocacy coalition without substantial 
legislative experience.  By the time of the passage of the ADA, much had 
changed although the disability community remained a loose 
confederation of groups primarily focused on specific disabilities and 
often with conflicting agendas.25  The passage of the Acts, which came in 
the face of simultaneously broad congressional support and widespread 
congressional indifference, helps elucidate some of the eventual problems 
that have arisen during the first decade of ADA implementation. 
 
 The Rehab Act was primarily staff-driven legislation, in which a 
handful of congressional staff members succeeded in ensuring the bill 
passed without much legislative attention, and then later helped to shape 
its direction by crafting extensive regulations. 26   As historian Ruth 
                                                 
     24   In its decisions, the Court has addressed the issue of accommodation on two 
occasions, neither of which involved cost issues.  In US Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 
(2002), the Supreme Court held that, in the ordinary course, employers were not required 
to override a seniority system as a means of accommodating a disabled worker.  At issue 
was the importance of seniority in a workplace and neutral workplace rules, but the case 
did not turn on the cost of the accommodation, which would have been trivial.  The other 
case that implicates the accommodation mandate involved the professional golfer Casey 
Martin who sought to use a golf cart on tour, a claim that was filed under the public 
accommodation provisions and which again did not involve any direct costs.  See PGA 
Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (finding that Martin and golf tournament were 
covered under the ADA and Martin was entitled to an accommodation). 
     25  One example is that wheelchair advocates seek ramps although those ramps can 
make it more difficult for blind individuals to get around.  Similarly, much of the deaf 
community has explicitly fought against assimilation into the hearing culture.   
     26  The history of the Rehab Act is traced in RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL 
TO CIVIL RIGHTS (2d Ed. 2001).  In general, I will avoid excessive citations, and note that 
my description of the passage of the Act comes primarily from Scotch supra, several law 
reviews cited within and RUTH O’BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN 
DISABILITY POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE (2001); JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE 
WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993); JACQUELINE 
VAUGHAN SWITZER, DISABLED RIGHTS: AMERICAN DISABILITY POLICY AND THE FIGHT 
FOR EQUALITY (2003).    
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O’Brien noted, the Rehab Act, also known as section 504, arose “without 
much forethought,” it just emerged.27   Despite its stealth nature, President 
Nixon twice vetoed the Rehab Act, although it was ultimately enacted in 
essentially its current form.  That form offers a very short directive 
applicable to the federal government and those receiving federal financial 
assistance.28   
 
When the statute was initially passed, it contained a vague 
definition of handicap, the term that was in use at the time.  During the 
following year, a more comprehensive definition was fashioned at the 
agency level, and the statute was amended in 1974 to incorporate the 
definition that continues to define disability today.29  The definition of 
handicap was, and the definition of disability is:   
 
“Any person who (A) has a physical or mental impairment 
which substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life 
activities, (b) has a record of such an impairment, OR (c) is regarded 
as having such an impairment.”30   
 
This definition requires virtually every term to be interpreted:  
substantially limited, major life activity, and what it means to be regarded 
as having an impairment.  After several years of delay, administrative 
regulations were developed to provide some guidance for interpreting the 
provisions of the Rehab Act,31 but perhaps more important to the evolution 
of disability rights was the open-ended language that went to the core of 
the statute’s scope. 
 
                                                 
     27  O’BRIEN, supra note 26 at 118.  Sociologist John Skrentny has explained the 
development of section 504 in a similar fashion:  “There were no details or explanations 
as to what [the statute] would mean and what limits might be on the potential remedies 
for exclusion.  Section 504 was simply a part of the politicians’ repertoire for addressing 
a group that they saw as analogous to black Americans.  No one paid any attention to 
what would become a revolutionary new policy.  There was never any discussion of 
Section 504.”  JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION 270 (2002).   
     28   The language of section 504(a) is: “No otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability in the United States, as defined in section 7(20), shall, solely by reason of her 
or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the 
United States Postal Service.”  29 U.S.C. §794(a) (as amended). 
     29  See Burgdorf,, supra note 9, at 420-21 (discussing origins of the definition of 
disability within the Rehabilitation Act).  The language that now defines disability was 
enacted as the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974.  See Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 
1617.     
     30  Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617. 
     31  The regulations were held up by the Reagan administration and were promulgated 
following several high profile protests where disabled individuals occupied offices of the 
responsible agency.  See SCOTCH, supra note 26, at --.    
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As noted previously, the need to define the protected class renders 
disability statutes different from other antidiscrimination statutes, and 
there is no easy way to define disability, or at least no easy way that will 
garner consensual support. 32   One possible approach would be to list 
certain conditions or disabilities that qualify for coverage but this 
approach would have the substantial disadvantage of requiring 
amendments any time a new disabling condition arose.  Given the way 
Congress, or any legislature operates, it was therefore important to adopt 
language that was sufficiently open-ended to allow for necessary evolution.  
Another approach might be to provide a non-exclusive list of qualifying 
conditions while leaving courts to determine whether conditions that are 
not included on the list should be covered disabilities.  This was, in fact, 
the approach taken in the regulations that were promulgated under the 
Rehab Act,33 although those regulations were not ultimately incorporated 
in the statutory language of the ADA.    
 
Not only is it difficult to define disability, but there is a significant 
dispute over  what constitutes a disability, or how disability ought to be 
defined.  The disability rights community generally favors a broad 
definition, one that is distinctly inclusive.34  Part of the impetus for a broad 
definition appears to stem from a desire to destigmatize the concept of 
disability:  labeling more people as disabled may destabilize the existing 
norms regarding abilities and what it means to have a disability.  While 
this might be a sound political project, it makes for a difficult legal one.  A 
broad definition, for example, might dilute the meaning of disability, 
particularly if virtually any individual can be defined as disabled, and it 
might also open the door to frivolous claims by individuals seeking to take 
advantage of an opportunity to enter the federal courthouse.  This in turn 
might alter the public support for disability rights, especially taking into 
account the cost concerns that accompany the accommodation mandate.  
Indeed, a broad definition is likely to fuel additional concerns about 
imposing excessive costs on businesses.  At the same time, there is little 
question that the prospect of a broad and inclusive definition enlarged the 
advocacy community for the statute and ultimately the push for a broad 
definition prevailed.35   
                                                 
     32  This is true even within federal statutes because of the varying contexts.  For 
example, the statute that governs education of the disabled focuses on functional issues 
relevant to schooling.  See Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals With 
Disabilities Education Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REV. 7 (2006).    
     33  The regulations are discussed extensively in Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 
480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
     34  For an influential approach along these lines see MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL 
THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION & THE AMERICAN LAW (1990); see also 
Burgdorf, at 539-44 (critiquing judicial restrictions of disability definition).   
     35 See SWITZER, supra note 26, at 101 (noting that some of the statute was expanded to 
increase political support).    
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 With this background in mind, three related aspects of the passage 
of the Rehab Act are noteworthy as they relate to the eventual passage of 
the ADA.  First, the Rehab Act was pushed by a handful of Senators with 
a deep interest in the subject who met very little opposition within 
Congress. 36   This intense but small support allowed interested 
congressional staff, and later agency staff, to shape the legislation without 
significant vetting or compromise.  Second, the bill was adopted without 
much public input, and without the development of any substantial social 
movement that may have helped increase both public awareness and a 
societal commitment to disability rights.37  As a concept, there is very little 
opposition to providing rights to the disabled;38 however, as evident by the 
two Presidential vetoes of the Rehab Act, there are substantial concerns 
regarding the costs that might accompany those rights and once the 
legislative initiative slides closer to the “special rights” or affirmative 
action category, public support weakens substantially. 39   Third, and 
directly related to the cost issue, the government’s interest in providing 
disability protections is multifaceted and its varied interests can lead to 
conflicting statutory goals.  To be sure, there is a strong desire to prevent 
discrimination against the disabled, as well as a desire to aid their quest to 
enter the workplace so that they can obtain the benefits that employment 
provides.  The government, however, also has a different and distinct 
interest because moving disabled individuals into the workplace will often 
move them off the public welfare roles.40  It is not always clear how this 
interest plays out, but it is another factor that makes disability different 
from other protected categories and may explain why these statutes faced 
so little opposition within Congress.41     
                                                 
     36  See SCOTCH, supra note 26, at 150-51. 
     37   Linda Krieger has noted, “[B]y the time the ADA was passed relatively little 
popular consciousness raising around disability issues had taken place.”  Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, Sociolegal Backlash, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA (L. Krieger ed. 2003); 
see also SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 117 (“The fight for disability rights was a largely 
invisible, almost underground, movement.”).  
     38  See polls cited earlier note 12.  In his work, Skrentny has concluded that, “Among 
all the groups who were part of the minority rights revolution . . . Americans – or at least 
their government leaders – see disabled Americans as the most deserving.”  SKRENTNY, 
supra note, at 274.  Obviously, this is a broad statement and there are many exceptions, 
including the infamous Buck v. Bell and the eugenics movement.  See  Buck v. Bell, 274 
U.S. 200 (1927).   
     39  See Kelman, supra note 22.  The Rehabilitation Act, in fact, contains an affirmative 
action component requiring the federal government and those with federal contracts that 
exceed $10,000 to establish affirmative action programs for the disabled.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 791 & 793.  
     40 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans With Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921 (2003) (discussing government’s interests in reducing 
welfare rolls). 
     41  A similar interest overhangs age discrimination, and Congress has, in fact, moved 
back the age of retirement as a way of limiting the costs of social security.  See Sara E. 
Rix, The Aging of the American Workforce, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 593, 602-03 (2006) 
(discussing increase in retirement age to 67 and its implications).  
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B. From the Rehab Act to the ADA:  the Rehab Act Cases.  
 
 Although the ADA has generated a tremendous amount of 
controversy and litigation, the Rehab Act was a very modest statute that 
failed to generate a substantial body of case law.  To offer one example, 
between 1973 and 1984, a total of 360 cases mentioning the Rehabilitation 
Act appeared in the LEXIS appellate court file, and most of those cases 
did not involve the substantive aspects of the act but instead focused on 
various jurisdictional issues. 42   There were, in fact, very few cases 
interpreting the definition of handicap.43  In contrast, a similar search for 
the single year 1997 turned up more than 900 appellate cases mentioning 
the ADA, a substantial number of which involved the very definition of 
disability.44  
 
 Even though the case law was sparse, many of the issues that have 
surfaced with the ADA were also present under the Rehab Act, and 
examining these cases demonstrates that courts approached the issues 
quite similarly.  For example, the first case the Supreme Court decided on 
the merits of the Rehab Act, Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 
exposed many of the contemporary tensions that remain prominent in the 
disability rights debate.45  The case involved a deaf nursing student who 
was seeking accommodations from the college for her studies; the 
Supreme Court, however, found that she was not qualified for the position 
because she would be unable to perform the functions of a nurse, and as a 
result, the college was under no obligation to accommodate her 
disability.46  In arriving at this conclusion, the Supreme Court rejected an 
agency interpretation as inconsistent with the statutory language, and also 
rejected the statements of interested members of Congress. 47   The 
unanimous opinion also distinguished between affirmative action 
                                                 
     42  The search was a very simple one “Rehabilitation w/2 Act” and date (bef 1985).  
Much of the case law involved educational issues and questions as to whether a private 
right of action existed under section 504 and whether the federal financial assistance had 
to be in a program related to the plaintiff.   
     43  To be sure, there were some isolated successes particularly in district courts.  See, 
e.g., Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (individual with history of drug 
use qualified as handicapped); Vickers v. Veteran’s Administration, 549 F. Supp. 85 (W. 
D. Wash. 1982) (individual with hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke handicapped).  But 
for every successful case there were an equivalent number of failed claims.  See, e.g., 
Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (overweight individual 
not handicapped); De la Torres v. Bolger, 610 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Tex. 1985), aff’d 781 
F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1986) (left-handed individual not handicapped). 
     44  The search in the LEXIS appellate database was “date (is 1997) and disability! and 
employ!” and produced 994 cases.  This statistic is not meant as anything other than a 
rough comparison, as it was done nonscientifically and the nature of the reporting 
services has changed so that many more unreported decisions are now available 
electronically.    
     45  442 U.S. 397 (1979).   
     46  Id. at 410-11. 
     47  Id. at 411 & n.11. 
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obligations, which were not at issue in the case, and the statute’s equal 
treatment mandate.48  All in all, as will become clear shortly, the Court’s 
decision had much in common with the contemporary cases decided under 
the ADA.   
 
 That was also true of the Court’s next case, Alexander v. Choate, 
although this case was decidedly more mixed in the benefits it offered to 
the disabled.49  Like Davis, Choate was not an employment case, but 
instead involved a challenge to a limitation on Medicaid reimbursement 
for hospital stays.  An important part of the case concerned whether the 
Rehab Act permitted disparate impact challenges, which the Court 
answered affirmatively.50  However, in another unanimous opinion, this 
time written by Justice Marshall, the Court also expressed a “desire to 
keep § 504 within manageable bounds,”51 noting further that the statute 
did not guarantee equal results. 52   Under these principles, the Court 
ultimately upheld the challenged regulation.53     
 
 If the first two cases were setbacks to a broad definition of 
disability, the third case may have appeared to open the door to an 
expansive judicial approach.  In School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 
the Supreme Court held that contagious diseases, in this case tuberculosis, 
fell within the scope of the statute, either under the definition of disability 
or under the “regarded as” language.54  The Arline case was undeniably 
significant, and it almost certainly sealed the subsequent decision to 
incorporate the Rehab Act’s definition into the ADA if for no other reason 
than the case was decided during the Act’s development in Congress.55   
At the same time, the success of Arline may have obscured some of the 
fundamental differences between the two statutes that would render an 
open-ended definition of disability less suited to a more comprehensive 
statute like the ADA, as well as the pattern of prior restrictive decisions 
that had arisen under the Act.  In addition to the cases discussed, Congress 
also passed three statutes in 1986 to override three Supreme Court 
decisions involving the rights of the disabled.  In these statutes, Congress 
overturned restrictive interpretations as applied to air carriers, sovereign 
                                                 
     48  Id. at 410. 
     49  469 U.S. 287 (1985).  
     50  Id. at 297. 
     51  Id. at 299. 
     52  Id. at 304. 
     53  Id. at 309. 
     54  480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
     55  A related case that was decided shortly after Arline, suggested the Court might be 
inclined to limit the definition of disability.  In Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988), 
the Supreme Court upheld a Veteran’s Administration regulation denominating most 
alcoholism as willful misconduct, and therefore not a disability, as consistent with the 
mandate of Section 504.  The issue was decided over the vigorous dissent of Justice 
Blackmun, who was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.     
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immunity issues, and education remedial issues. 56  Contrary to the stated 
views of most disability advocates, very few cases brought under the 
Rehab Act sought to expand the definition of disability to include non-
traditional disabilities, and those few cases typically failed.57   
 
As a result, by the time the ADA deliberations began, the Rehab 
Act offered a rather weak model for implementing broad disability 
protections.  If anything, the experience under the Rehab Act should have 
offered caution, rather than unbridled optimism, about the future course of 
disabilities law,58 particularly in the context of a disabilities statute that 
left substantial room for judicial interpretation.  Indeed, as Professor 
Charles Craver has emphasized, the plaintiff ultimately lost her claim in 
Arline because it was determined that her disease rendered her unqualified 
to teach.59 
 
C. The Passage of the ADA. 
 
The ADA was introduced in Congress in the late-1980s at the 
behest of a number of members who had particular experience with 
disabilities.  The primary house sponsor Tony Coehlo suffered from 
epilepsy and had been subjected to discrimination in his youth as a result 
of his condition.  In the Senate, Tom Harkin, whose brother was deaf, took 
the lead, where he was joined by many other influential Senators who also 
                                                 
     56   See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the 
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 631-33 (1991) 
(discussing the statutes).       
     57  As noted, very few such claims arose in the appellate courts, and I could not find 
any claim involving high blood pressure, chemical sensitivity, or some of the other cases 
that have arisen with frequency under the ADA.  At the time of the Rehab Act, the claims 
that sought to stretch the statutory definition involved mental disabilities such as 
depression, which was less well accepted as a disability at the time.  See, e.g., Doe v. 
Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm’n, 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(employee’s depressive neurosis rendered her no longer qualified for her job); Hart v. 
City of Baltimore, 625 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1980) (claim of disability relating to chemical 
imbalance abandoned at oral argument).  On the flip side, some of the conditions that are 
now litigated, were accepted as disabilities without question under the Rehab Act.  See 
Bentivegna v. U.S. DOL, 694 F.2d 619, 621 (1982 ) (diabetic unquestionably 
handicapped under the Rehab Act).   
     58  Chai Feldblum has argued that at the time of the ADA, the courts’ interpretations of 
the Rehab Act had been generally favorable to an expansive interpretation.  See Chai 
Feldblum, Definition of Disabled Under Federal Antidiscrimination Law: What 
Happened? Why? And What We Can Do About It?  21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91 
(2000).  Looking at the cases she relies on suggests that many, and perhaps most, of the 
claims involved traditional disabilities and were not particularly difficult cases.  What 
would be important to know is whether certain conditions or impairments were defined as 
a disability under the Rehab Act that are not so defined under the ADA.  Even then, it is 
important to keep in mind that extending the Rehab Act into the private sector would 
create new issues for courts compared to the relatively obscure Rehab Act. 
     59  See Charles B. Craver, The Judicial Disabling of the Employment Discrimination 
Provisions of the Americans With Disabilties Act, 18 LABOR LWYR. 417, 423 (2003).  
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had personal experience with disabilities --  Senator Kennedy had a sister 
who suffered from mental retardation, Bob Dole lost the use of his right 
arm in the military, and Senator OrinHatch’s brother-in-law suffered from 
polio.60  These and other members would play critical roles in ensuring the 
passage of the ADA, and perhaps because of the personal connections to 
issues of disability, there was virtually no opposition to the ADA in either 
the House or the Senate.    
 
Among advocates, the lack of opposition is almost always seen as 
desirable because it speeds the bill’s journey through the legislature.  The 
lack of controversy, however, can just as easily lead to problems during 
the implementation of the statute that might have been addressed through 
more careful congressional deliberation.  This was particularly true in the 
context of the ADA, which arose at an unusually complex time concerning 
the interaction between Congress and the courts.  At the time the ADA 
was passed, Congress was largely receptive to the demands of civil rights 
groups, while the Court was not, resulting in a situation in which the 
courts, if given an opportunity, could readily take away what Congress 
had provided.  This tension between the branches should have counseled 
in favor of clear statutory language designed to limit judicial discretion.  
Yet, rather than crafting specific language that would tie the Court’s hands, 
the disability community quickly opted to import the broad definition of 
disability from the Rehab Act into the ADA.  It is quite possible that this 
move simply proved too irresistible given that it would be difficult for 
Congress, or the statute’s opponents, to object to a definition it had already 
adopted.   At the same time, there were many reasons why a broad 
definition that relied on judicial interpretation would prove problematic 
for the ADA.61                       
 
     Perhaps most significantly, a broad definition of disability was in 
clear tension with the tenor of the Supreme Court at the time.  An open-
ended and potentially expansive definition of disability would have its best 
chance to succeed with a Court that was sympathetic to the statutory goals 
or perhaps one that was determined to remain faithful to the congressional 
language.  Yet, in 1988-89 when the ADA was debated in Congress, there 
was no reason to see the Supreme Court as sympathetic to any aspect of 
civil rights.  The Civil Rights Acts of 1990 and 1991 were designed to 
overturn a series of hostile civil rights decisions, and there was no reason 
to expect the Supreme Court of the early 1990s to interpret the ADA any 
                                                 
     60  See SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 117-19.  In addition to the Congressional members, 
President Bush had a son with a severe learning disability, and Attorney General 
Thornburg’s son suffered significant head injuries in an accident.  Id. at 119. 
     61 Cf. Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Equal Protection, and the 
Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of Progressive & Retrogressive Logic in 
Constitutional Classification, 35 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 81, 85 (2001-02) (suggesting 
that Congress was negligent for adopting Rehab Act definition).  
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differently than it had interpreted Title VII.62  In fact, there was reason to 
expect that the Court might treat the ADA even more hostilely, since the 
ADA did not have the broad public support of Title VII, nor did it have a 
lobbying arm as powerful as the AARP with respect to the ADEA, or the 
traditional civil rights groups such as the NAACP for Title VII.  The ADA 
was also a new and innovative statute that posed issues to which a 
conservative court would naturally be skeptical, in large part because of 
the explicit cost considerations embodied in the accommodation mandate.  
After all, the Supreme Court’s evisceration of the disparate impact 
standard in the notorious Ward’s Cove case, which prompted the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, arose primarily due to a judicial concern with the 
costs the impact standard imposed on employers.63  Looking to Title VII, 
then, as opposed to the Rehab Act, there was no reason to expect the 
Supreme Court would be receptive to the far-reaching and novel aspects of 
the ADA, and this was true even before the onslaught of frivolous 
disability claims that later emerged.    
 
 At the same time, while the Supreme Court appeared to be in a 
manifestly hostile mood towards civil rights, Congress’s disposition was 
almost exactly the opposite.  In detailing the history of the passage of the 
ADA, one of the lobbyists noted that it was a very difficult time to move 
civil rights legislation through Congress, but historically this was deeply 
inaccurate.64  The Congress that passed the ADA was among the most 
prolific in our nation’s history in passing Civil Rights legislation, and 
undoubtedly the most prolific since the mid-1960s.  During the time the 
ADA was under consideration, Congress passed the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1987 (to overturn a Supreme Court decision), the 
Family Medical Leave Act, ultimately three times because of two 
presidential vetoes, substantial amendments to the Fair Housing Act, an 
important Age Discrimination bill, a revision of the Rehab Act, as well as 
the Civil Rights Acts of 1990 and 1991.65  If ever there was a time for 
passage of civil rights legislation, it was in the late 1980s.   
 
 All of this legislative activity came with a downside that was 
particularly problematic for the ADA.   Of all the civil rights statutes that 
                                                 
     62   See William N. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation 
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 333  n.4 (1991).  This is a part of the ADA story that is 
often overlooked by those who focus on the limitations of the ADA, without thinking 
more broadly about other civil rights statutes.  The ADA was considered in Congress at 
the same time the highly controversial Civil Rights Acts of 1990 and 1991 were being 
debated, though virtually all of the public attention, and controversy, were focused on the 
Civil Rights Acts rather than the ADA. 
     63 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
     64 SWITZER,  supra note 26, at 86. 
     65  See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987); 42 U.S.C. § 3601 
(Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1991); 
42 U.S.C. § 2601 (Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993); 29 U.S.C. § 626 (Older 
Workers Benefit Protection Act).  
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were passed towards the end of the decade, the ADA proved among the 
least controversial.  The Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) was 
vetoed twice by President Bush; 66  the Civil Rights Act of 1990 was 
likewise vetoed,67 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was headed for a veto 
until the Clarence Thomas hearings intervened.68  As a consequence, all of 
these statutes received more congressional attention, and more legislative 
massaging than the ADA.  The Civil Rights Act of 1991, for example, 
provided very specific statutory language that has guided the Supreme 
Court in a more moderate direction over the last decade.69   
 
The lobbying community also made an important tactical decision 
that may have further limited the possibility of an expansive interpretive 
approach to the statute.  Early in the process the lobbying community 
decided not to mount a large publicity campaign for the ADA or to rally 
broad public support for the statute but instead decided to work solely 
within Congress.70  This decision was primarily due to a sense that public 
support for the statute was unnecessary and might stir up unwanted 
opposition.71  Congressional support for the statute was strong, and there 
was very little open opposition within Congress to the goals of the ADA.  
What little opposition there was centered on questions relating to 
homosexuality, and a handful of conservative members of Congress 
criticized the potential scope of the Act but to no persuasive effect.72  In 
light of this broad support, the business lobby also decided early in the 
                                                 
     66  Kara Swisher, Twice-Vetoed Family Leave Act Takes Effect: Law Allows Twelve 
Weeks of Unpaid Time Off Without Loss of Benefits, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1993, at D8. 
     67  See 136 Cong. Rec. § 16562 (1990) (Presidential veto message on Civil Rights Act 
of 1990). 
     68  As a young attorney with the Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights, I participated 
in the drafting of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  The bill was effectively stalled until the 
Clarence Thomas hearings brought attention to discrimination issues, in particular to the 
lack of damages for sexual harassment that did not result in the loss of a job.  Senator 
Danforth, who was simultaneously shepherding his former aide Clarence Thomas 
through his contentious hearings while serving as the Republican leader on the Civil 
Rights Act, pledged to ensure passage of the Act regardless of the outcome of the 
confirmation hearings.  With his leadership, the act passed the day after the hearings 
concluded without any significant legislative record being developed.  For a similar 
recollection see Roger Clegg, A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
54 LA. L. REV. 1459, 1469-70 (1994) (labeling the Thomas hearings as a “breakthrough” 
for the passage of the Civil Rights Act.).  
     69  See discussion infra note 155 and accompanying text. 
     70 See SWITZER, supra note 26, at 107 (“Avoiding the media and any attempt to try to 
explain the legislation to the press became a key element of the fight for passage of the 
ADA.”). 
     71   See Joseph Shapiro, Disability Policy and the Media: A Stealth Civil Rights 
Movement Bypasses the Press and Defies Conventional Wisdom, 22 POL’Y STUDIES J. 
123 (1994)(discussing strategy and disregard for the media). 
     72  For discussion of the limited opposition see Wendy F. Hensel & Gregory Todd 
Jones, Bridging the Physical-Mental Gap: An Empirical Look at the Impact of Mental 
Illness Stigma on ADA Outcomes, 73 TENN. L. REV. 47, 58-59 (2005) and Burgdorf, 
supra note 9. 
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process to deescalate its opposition and to instead focus on fashioning a 
bill it could live with.73   
 
The decision by the lobbying community to produce a statute 
under the public radar ultimately proved a mistake, and likely a serious 
one.  Without broad public support, without a coherent social movement 
pushing an expansive agenda, there was little reason to expect that the 
ADA could, by legislative fiat, expand the definition of disability to 
include those with nontraditional disabilities.  Not only was there no 
apparent public support for an expansive approach to disability, but the 
statute’s normative force was never adequately articulated.  There was, for 
example, no public discussion of why the ADA did not involve “special 
rights,” why the accommodation mandate was a product of right and 
equity rather than special treatment akin to affirmative action, or why 
disability rights ought to be seen as equivalent to earlier civil rights 
movements.  In a recent article, Professor Michael Stein notes that many 
continue to view the ADA as involving special rights, but without a social 
movement to change that perception, there was very little the legislation 
could do to alter the public consciousness.74  More was needed than new 
legislation, and that more never materialized.  Instead, the disability rights 
community feared a public dialogue and sought refuge in the courts, the 
wrong place, by almost any measure, for refuge.    
 
Had there been a public dialogue, it is also quite likely that the 
disability community would have opted for a more narrow statutory 
definition because the community would have been required to advocate a 
basis for the statute, a basis that would have likely stemmed from 
discrimination, structural barriers that could be alleviated, or the needs of 
the disabled.  This may have also focused the advocacy community on 
justifying a broad definition of disability or to confront some of the many 
issues that have subsequently arisen, such as whether temporary 
disabilities, or disabilities that arise out of work, are deserving of statutory 
protection, or whether individuals with rather minor conditions, such as 
allergies, ought to be treated as disabled.  The advocacy community, in 
fact, seemed fully aware of this problem, and its efforts aimed at ensuring 
passage of the Act all focused on traditional disabilities.  Indeed, virtually 
all of the public displays and protests relating to the ADA suggested a 
relatively narrow definition of disability, one that emphasized traditional 
disabilities, and one that is consistent with the later court interpretations.  
Deaf students at Gallaudet University mounted highly visible and 
successful protests calling for a deaf University President, disabled 
                                                 
     73 See Paula Yost, Business Not Fighting Bill for Disabled, WASH. POST., at A12, Aug. 
19, 1989 (explaining that business lobby decided to work towards a more palatable bill 
rather than opposing it outright). 
     74 Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations 
as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 579 (2004). 
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individuals crawled up the Capitol building to demonstrate its lack of 
accessibility, while others tied themselves to buses and engaged in similar 
protests centered around traditional disabilities. 75   The members of 
Congress whose support was based on personal experiences with 
disabilities also involved traditional disabilities, including deafness, cancer, 
paralysis, and epilepsy.  In other words, entirely missing from the public 
debate was a discussion regarding the need for a broader definition of 
disability, one for which public support appeared to be missing and a 
public justification lacking.       
 
In addition to the experiences under Title VII and the Rehab Act, 
the nascent Fair Housing Act (FHA) amendments also should have given 
pause to the hope of an expansive judicial interpretation, although in 
fairness the statute was far too new to provide much guidance on the ADA.  
Nevertheless, the experience under the FHA is instructive because it has 
paralleled that of the ADA.  Early in the life of the FHA amendments 
many claims arose that sought to stretch the definition of disability to 
include chemical sensitivity to fertilizer; to avoid no pet policies in 
apartment complexes, some plaintiffs argued that their pets were support 
animals necessary to combat symptoms of depression.76  It is unlikely that 
all of these claims were frivolous, but almost all of the claims were 
unsuccessful. 
     
Before discussing the Supreme Court cases interpreting the ADA, I 
want to highlight one other problem that was lurking in the background 
                                                 
     75  See SHAPIRO, supra note --, at 127-30 (discussing Gallaudet protests).  For a book-
length treatment see JACK R. GANNON, THE WEEK THE WORLD HEARD GALLAUDET 
(1989).  More recently, student protests erupted again at Gallaudet over the selection of a 
President who was not seen as sufficiently tied to the deaf community, in part because 
she read lips.  The protests resulted in the Trustees changing their decision.  See Susan 
Kinzie, Nelson Hernandez & David A. Fahrenthold, Gallaudet Board Ousts Fernandes: 
As Protesters Cheer, Trustees Say Law-Breakers Will be Held Accountable, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 30, 2006 at A1.  
     76  For some of the chemical sensitivity cases see Braldey v. Brown 42 F.3d 434 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (excluding evidence relating to multiple chemical sensitivity under Daubert 
test); Summers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Sys., 132 F.3d 599, 603 (10th Cir. 1997) (labeling 
multiple chemical sensitivity a “controversial diagnosis”); Gabbard v. Linn-Benton 
Housing Auth., 219 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Ore. 2002) (excluding evidence and citing 
cases where theory has been rejected), aff’d, Wroncy v. Oregon Dept. of Transportation, 
94 Fed. Appx. 559 (9th Cir. 2004).  Cases involving pets include Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 
F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that dog had “no discernible skills” but was rather a 
“simple house pet and weapon against cranky landlord”); Wells v. State Manuf. Homes, 
2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 136048 (D. Me. 2005) (rejecting claim that pet was necessary 
accommodation to get around no-pet policy); Prindable v. Ass’n Apt. Owners of 2987 
Kalakana, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Haw. 2003) (bulldog was not a trained service 
animal).  When the dog is trained to provide specific services, courts often will override 
no pet policies.  See Green v. Housing Authority, 994 F. Supp. 1253 (D. Ore. 1998) 
(trained dog permitted for hearing disabled child); Fulciniti v. Village of Shadyside 
Condo Ass’n, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23450 (W.D. Pa. 1998) (permitting dog trained to 
help individual with MS).   
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that should have provided additional caution to those seeking an expansive 
definition of disability.  A broad interpretation posed particular problems 
for employers, not just in the immediate costs of accommodation, but in 
providing opportunities for workers to raise excuses for their workplace 
behavior.  There are very few things that anger employers more than lazy 
workers or workers seeking to gain an unearned advantage in the 
workplace, and courts interested in protecting the interests of employers, 
as many are, would likely interpret the statute to ensure that it did not 
become a font for worker grievances.  Indeed, to the extent the ADA was 
perceived as providing statutory protections to lazy workers, malingerers, 
and whiners -- those who have a difficult time coping with the everyday 
stresses of the workplace -- it was a virtual certainty that courts would cut 
back on the statute to eliminate those protections.  In fact, that is what 
happened.  To date, the largest volume of ADA claims have been brought 
by individuals with bad backs, which is largely an extension of an issue 
that has long plagued social security and workers’ compensation systems 
where back injuries have generated a tremendous amount of litigation and 
controversy for decades.77  As noted earlier, efforts to expand the FHA 
amendments to cover various conditions not typically thought of as 
disabilities, such as chemical sensitivity, have been met with strong 
resistance, and similar issues have arisen in the educational context, 
particularly as it relates to learning disabilities where the rise in the 
number of diagnosed disabilities has produced a sharp public reaction.78  
In a similar context, there have been widely publicized attacks on the work 
of Sigmund Freud and the efficacy of psychotherapy more generally,79 as 
                                                 
     77  On its website, the EEOC reports that injuries to the back accounted for 11.4% of 
ADA claims filed with the agency between 1992-2005.  Only two other categories 
involving non-specific conditions, that denominated “Other” and “Regarded As,” had 
higher percentages.  The statistics can be found at www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada.html.  On 
back injuries in other contexts see David Mechanic & Ronald J. Angel, Some Factors 
Associated with the Report and Evaluation of Back Pain, 28 J. OF HEALTH & SOCIAL 
BEHAVIOR 131 (1987) (discussing prevalence of back pain in disability and workers’ 
compensation claims).   
     78  John Silber mounted a public attack on the concept of learning disabilities one that 
was ultimately rejected in the district court.  See Guckenberger v. Boston University, 974 
F. Supp. 106 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding BU’s policy on learning disabilities in violation of 
ADA).  While John Silber is a controversial figure, many mainstream and thoughtful 
academics have also questioned the rise of learning disabilities.  See, e.g., MARK 
KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL 
TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES (1997).  For an overview of the 
issues relating to learning disabilities and accommodation see John D. Ranseen & 
Gregory S. Parks, Test Accommodations for Postsecondary Students: The Quandary 
Resulting from the ADA’s Disability Definition, 11 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & LAW 83 (2005).  
    79  Frederick Crews mounted strong attacks on Freud in the left-leaning New York 
Review of Books that received widespread attention.  See FREDERICK CREWS, THE 
MEMORY WARS: FREUD’S LEGACY IN DISPUTE (1995).  An earlier critique by Jeffrey 
Masson became something of a best seller.  See JEFFREY MOUSSAIEFF MASSON, ASSAULT 
ON TRUTH: FREUD’S SUPPRESSION OF THE SEDUCTION THEORY (1984), and later FINAL 
ANALYSIS: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF A PSYCHOANALYST (1990).  
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well as repressed memory syndrome,80 Ritalin and ADHD,81 all of which 
suggest that society has not embraced the broad definition of disability 
pushed by advocates, a definition that could encompass somewhere 
between one-quarter and one-half of all Americans.  Absent either 
inexplicably clear statutory language or broad public support, it was surely 
a mistake to think these non-traditional disability issues might be 
favorably received in the courts.  And, true to form, they have not been.  
 
Some of the very first claims to arise under the ADA came from 
law students seeking additional time on the bar examination because they 
had bad memories, claims that generally failed.82  My nonscientific review 
of the literature suggests that the most frequently requested workplace 
accommodation is a right to work at home, or in the alternative, a right to 
set one’s own hours, or to come in late.83  Not surprisingly, these claims 
have uniformly failed and one reason is that they are precisely the kind of 
claims that the business community becomes most exercised about 
because, to them, these claims exude laziness or malingering.84  These 
claims also reflect the way in which the disability statute can be abused by 
                                                 
     80  See ELIZABETH LOFTUS, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED MEMORY: FALSE MEMORIES 
AND ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE (1996). 
     81 See, e.g., Bill Scanlon, Scamming for Ritalin: College Students Fake Attention-
Deficit Disorder, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 8, 1998, at 54A (discussing students seeking 
Ritalin for its buzz effect); John Merrow, Reading, Writing, and Ritalin, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
21, 1995, at 21 (“Ritalin is so plentiful that in some junior high schools it’s a ‘gateway 
drug,’ the first drug a child experiments with.”); Rebecca Paul, Atlanta Leads South in 
Ritalin Prescriptions: Critics Say Many Kids Don’t Need the Drug, ATL. J. & CONST., 
Nov. 8, 1992, at A1 (lead story on “Ritalin controversy”).  
     82  See, e.g., Argen v. New York State Bd. of Examiners, 860 F. Supp. 84 (W.D. N. Y. 
1994) (plaintiff failed to establish specific learning disability); Christina v. New York 
State Bd. of Examiners, 899 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (dismissing case after 
plaintiff passed the bar examination).  There were also a series of early challenges to bar 
exam inquiries regarding mental health treatment, which ultimately led to modifications 
of most state policies.  See Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. 
Va. 1995).    
     83  See, e.g., Moore v. Payless Shoe Source, Inc., 139 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(“An employee who is unable to come to work on a regular basis [is] unable to satisfy 
any of the functions of the job in question . . . “); Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 530 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994) (coming to work regularly is an essential function of the job); Halperin v. 
Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 198 (4th Cir. 1997) (regular attendance at job 
required); Rauen v. United States Tobacco Mfg., 319 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2003) (request to 
work at home found unreasonable as accommodation); Mason v. Avaya Communications, 
Inc., 357 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2004) (denying right to work at home to individual 
suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome). 
84  For representative cases see Tyndall v. National Educ. Centers, 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th 
Cir. 19940 ((“a regular and reliable level of attendance is a necessary element of most 
jobs . . .”); Rauen v. United States Tobacco Mfg., 319 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The 
reason working at home is rarely a reasonable accommodation is because most jobs 
require the kind of teamwork, personal interaction, and supervision that simply cannot be 
had in a home office situation.”).  Extrapolating to the Supreme Court, the same reception 
was almost assured.  After all, Justice Rehnquist died in office, Justices O’Connor and 
Ginsburg worked through serious illnesses, and Justice Stevens is still working at age 86.    
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individuals who have no other outlet for their workplace complaints, often 
as a result of the formidable employment-at-will rule which sharply limits 
the common law rights of workers.  Because of this limitation, workers 
often search for any statutory grounds to state a claim and the malleable 
nature of the disability definition has led many employees – likely 
prompted by attorneys – to try to fit their claims under the ADA. Even 
though many individuals who brought such claims may have had 
legitimate health conditions that should have fallen within the literal scope 
of the ADA, there was little question that the claims would be received 
hostilely.  But this is quite different from a backlash, or if it is a backlash it 
is one that is not unique to the courts as the effort to expand the definition 
of disability to reach nontraditional disabilities has failed to gain broad 
societal acceptance.   
 
This confluence of factors rendered the prospects of an expansive, 
or literal, interpretation of disability remote at best.  Instead what should 
have been expected was a substantial judicial rewriting of the statute, one 
that was likely to mirror existing social norms, where there is generally 
broad support for protecting those with serious disabilities – even though 
there remain substantial concerns regarding the potential costs of 
accommodation – and little support for extending the statute to those who 
appear undeserving of protection.  
   
III. THE CASES:  A BACKLASH? 
 
The social backdrop presented above leads to a discussion of the 
Supreme Court cases typically defined as the heart of the judicial backlash.  
In this section I will explore the cases, with a particular focus on Sutton v. 
United Airlines, and seek to explain the rationality of the decisions, or 
alternatively, why the decisions were highly predictable given the 
statutory directive and governing social norms. 
 
A. Sutton v. United Airlines:  Restricting the Scope of the Statute. 
 
The case of  Sutton v. United Airlines involved  twin sisters who 
worked as commuter airline pilots and sought to move up the professional 
ranks to fly commercial planes for United Airlines.85  The Sutton sisters 
suffered from severe myopia and were unable to satisfy the airlines’ 
qualification standard of having uncorrected vision of 20/100.86  When 
                                                 
     85  See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
     86  Because the Supreme Court decided that the Suttons did not qualify as disabled 
under the statute, the airline never had to justify its rule.  Presumably the rule was based 
on safety concerns, particularly in the event of turbulence or some other disruption during 
which the pilot might lose her glasses.  Kenji Yoshino has suggested that, as an 
accommodation, the Suttons could have been allowed to bring an extra pair of glasses on 
the plane.  KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 175 
(2006).  Having an extra pair of glasses may have helped in the event one pair broke (or 
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United rejected them based on their eyesight, the sisters sued arguing that 
their condition rendered them disabled under the statute and required the 
airline to provide a reasonable accommodation, presumably allowing them 
to wear corrective lenses while flying.  Alternatively, they argued that if 
they were not disabled under the terms of the statute, the employer was 
regarding them as disabled because United was treating them as if their 
eyesight was a substantial limitation.87   
 
With those facts in mind, it is difficult to conceive of a worse test 
case than the Suttons presented and the only real surprise was how close 
the case ended up – and it was close only because the dissenters 
understood just how much was at stake.88   Nevertheless, the Sutton case is 
generally identified as the critical backbone of the judicial backlash,89 so a 
detailed analysis of the case will help demonstrate why it is a misnomer to 
label the interpretive developments as a backlash against the disabled.   
Rather, the Sutton case is best understood as the product of a poorly 
worded statute that too easily opened itself to opportunistic plaintiffs who 
were never intended to be its beneficiary.90   
                                                                                                                                                 
contact lenses came out) but would not help in the more likely circumstance of turbulence 
or other disruption.  
     87    The “regarded as” issue will be discussed further below, but I also want to 
highlight a potential problem with the argument that rendered it ill-fitting for this case.  
Under the original vision of the statute,  a plaintiff who is regarded as disabled should not 
need an accommodation because they are not disabled.  The Suttons, however, would 
have needed an accommodation:  they could not see sufficiently without their glasses, 
and so they would need to be allowed to wear them.  Courts have split over the question 
whether an accommodation is required for those who are regarded as disabled.  See 
D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, 422 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that employer must 
offer accommodations to regarded as disabled individuals and discussing circuit split)   
     88  Justice Stevens and Breyer dissented 
     89  For critiques of the Sutton case see Samuel A. Marcosson, Of Square Pegs & 
Round Holes: The Supreme Court’s Ongoing “Title Vii-ization” of the Americans With 
Disabilities Act,  8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 361, 374-78 (2004); Aviam Soifer,  The 
Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1279, 
1304-06 (2000); Rebecca Hammer White, Deference and Disabling Discrimination, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 532 (2002).  
     90  As noted previously, for a variety of reasons, the statute has generated an unusually 
large group of claims based on conditions not typically identified as a disability.  For an 
additional sampling of cases, all of which were unsuccessful see Nuzum v. Ozark Auto 
Distribs., 432 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2005) (tendenitis in left elbos); Anderson v. North 
Dakota State Hosp., 232 F.3d 634 (8th Cir. 2000) (fear of snakes); Sinkler v. Midwest 
Prop. Mgt., 209 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2000) (fear of driving in unfamiliar places); Land v. 
Baptist Med. Ctr., 164 F.3d 423 (8th Cir. 1999) (peanut allergies); Heilweil v. Mount 
Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1147 (1995) (asthma 
aggravated by work); Byrne v. Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1992) (allergy to 
fungus); Cormier v. Littlefield, 112 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass. 2000) (temporary knee 
injury); Kristofor v. Schinbben, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2809 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (allergy to 
latex); Cameron v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Ill. 1998) 
(fearing of being around suspended tools); Dewitt v. Carsen, 941 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D. 
1996) (correctional officer’s stress caused by interaction with inmates), aff’d, 122 F.3d 
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The primary doctrinal question presented in Sutton was whether 
determining if an individual is disabled should consider available 
mitigating measures or whether that preliminary inquiry should assess the 
plaintiff in his or her unmitigated state.  Within disability law, this is an 
enormous question because many potentially disabling conditions can be 
mitigated through various corrective measures such as hearing aids, 
prosthetic devices and perhaps most commonly, medication.  Taking into 
account mitigating measures might exclude from the statute’s protective 
scope individuals who formed the core group Congress intended to protect, 
including individuals with epilepsy, such as the original House Sponsor 
Tony Coehlo, since epilepsy can generally be controlled by medication.91  
Ignoring mitigating measures, on the other hand, would allow many 
individuals who would not be considered disabled in any ordinary sense of 
the word into federal court, and to the Supreme Court, this group included 
those who wear glasses.  In the briefs, and at the oral argument, it was 
repeatedly emphasized that as many as 100 million Americans used 
corrective lenses92 and the Supreme Court was exceedingly unlikely to 
open the door to all, or even some, of those individuals.   
 
As a result, this was the very kind of case that could have been 
anticipated by the legislative drafters but, if left unaddressed in the statute, 
would likely lead to a narrowing of the statute’s scope.  This was true not 
only because the potential class was enormous, but as such unsympathetic 
plaintiffs the Suttons played on all of the Supreme Court’s fears regarding 
the potential direction of the statute.  For example, this case could be 
identified as falling within the special rights category insofar as the 
plaintiffs could be perceived as undeserving plaintiffs seeking an unfair 
advantage in the workplace.93  The Suttons already had very good jobs, 
and their glasses posed a real safety issue to passengers.94  On this score, 
even if the Suttons had been defined as disabled, they ultimately would 
have lost their claim as a safety matter, given that the statute permits work 
rules necessary to ensure safety under several different statutory 
approaches.95   
                                                                                                                                                 
1079 (11th Cir. 1997);  Mescal v. Marra, 49 F. Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (mental 
anxiety caused by interaction with supervisor).            
     91  See SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 117.   
     92  Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487 (“[T]he number of people with vision impairments alone is 
100 million.”). 
     93 While the Suttons were not demonstrably less qualified than other candidates given 
that the vision requirement was a safety issue rather than one that went to their ability to 
fly a plane, it was easy to see this case as involving individuals seeking to take advantage 
of a statute that was not designed for their benefit.  But see Pamela S. Karlan & George 
Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, & Reas. Accom., 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 14 (1996) 
(equating duty to accommodate with affirmative action). 
     94  See note 69 supra.  The only mitigating factor was that United had the most 
stringent requirement in the industry. 
     95  This point was emphasized by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion.  Id. at 511 
(Stevens, J. dissenting).  One might have argued that the airlines should be required to 
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The most important failing of their claims, however, was that their 
condition had nothing to do with the underlying concept of discrimination:  
there is no basis for claiming that those who wear glasses are the victims 
of discrimination (schoolyard taunts aside) that federal law ought to 
concern itself with.  Nor was there any sense that with their glasses on, the 
Suttons were limited in their ability to see.  Rather, with their glasses on, 
they were like anyone else who regularly wears glasses and their daily life 
was not generally affected in any substantial way.  It is difficult to 
conceive of any reason a Court ought to want to protect these individuals, 
and the reasonable fear that there were many more individuals like the 
Suttons waiting in the wings made their claim even more precarious.    
 
In their defense, the Suttons had extremely poor eye-sight and the 
Court certainly could have drawn a line designed to exclude from the 
statute’s scope only those with less severe limitations.  But the Court 
needed a reason to draw that line, and it never found one.  At the oral 
argument, this issue was addressed explicitly by one of the Justices.96  
Even though the Suttons may have been more limited in their ability to see 
than most people, the Justice noted, once they put on their glasses they 
were effectively the same. 97   Why then should the severity of the 
underlying condition matter when the mitigating measures equalize them?   
The answer proffered by the Suttons’ attorney was wholly unpersuasive.  
He claimed that the statute told the Court to make that distinction, an 
argument that was incorrect on two different levels.  The statute said 
nothing about whether mitigating measures should be considered in the 
disability calculus; that issue was addressed specifically in the Committee 
Reports, a place a majority of the Court was reluctant to look.98  More to 
                                                                                                                                                 
prove the danger but that would obviously be a significantly more expensive proposition 
if all such work rules had to be justified.  Moreover, this seems like precisely the kind of 
claim where intuitive analyses are likely to prevail:  while there may have been only a 
small risk of harm, the potential danger is tremendous, the very kind of situation that is 
most likely to be magnified.    
     96   Sutton was decided at a time when the Justices were not identified by name in the 
oral argument  transcripts.  
     97  A substantial portion of the oral argument was devoted to the question whether 
such a line was possible, and desirable.  The Oral Argument transcript is available at 
1999 WL 281310. 
    98  Although by the time of Sutton, a majority of the Supreme Court had become 
hostile to legislative history, the movement away from reliance on legislative history was 
clearly present at the time the ADA was adopted.  Both Judge Easterbrook and Justice 
Scalia had long and forcefully challenged the relevance of legislative history.  See, e.g., 
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988)(Scalia, J.) (writing for the Court and rejecting 
committee reports); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345 (1988)(Scalia, J. 
concurring)(“[I]t must be assumed that what members of [Congress] thought they were 
voting for, and what the President thought he was approving when he signed the bill, was 
what the text plainly said, rather than what a few Representatives or even a Committee 
Report, said it said.”).  Judge Easterbrook laid out his theory in a series of highly 
influential articles.  See Frank Easterbrook, The Rule of Original Intent in Statutory 
Construction, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 59 (1988); Frank Easterbrook, The Supreme 
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the point, neither the statute nor the legislative history suggested that the 
severity of the unmitigated condition should be a relevant factor – from 
the legislative materials, the question was whether mitigating factors 
should be considered not whether they should sometimes be considered.  
A decision to focus on the severity of the underlying condition could only 
arise from a pragmatic determination to limit the breadth of the disability 
class while preserving what might be considered core claims.  Yet, the 
Suttons were not within the core group, and part of their argument, a part 
that went unarticulated, was that the Court should provide them statutory 
coverage as a way of preserving coverage for other deserving plaintiffs – 
those who use prosthetic devices, suffer from epilepsy or other substantial 
conditions that can be treated with medication.  This is understandably a 
difficult argument for a party to make and there were good reasons why 
the argument went undeveloped.   
 
Importantly, the Court sought to limit the potential damage of its 
ruling by noting that even those who have access to mitigating measures 
may still qualify as disabled so long as they remain limited in a major life 
activity.99  This part of the Court’s decision has mitigated some of the 
fears of the blacklash critics, and plaintiffs with serious disabilities, for 
example, those who might use prosthetic devices or those with severe 
depression, have generally qualified as disabled even after Sutton.100  In 
this way, the Court drew a line that sought to preserve core claims while 
excluding those the Court considered beyond the proper scope of the 
statute.  By proper, I do not mean that which was consistent with 
congressional intent.  As alluded to above, the legislative history was 
reasonably clear that an individual should be considered in their 
unmitigated state.101  By proper, I mean what the Court considered the 
appropriate scope of the disability statute, independent of Congress’s 
actual intent.   
There remains the complicated issue of the “regarded as” prong of 
the statute, which is where much of the criticism of the case has 
focused.102  The Suttons argued that if they were not disabled under the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Court, 1983 Term – Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(1984); Frank Easterbrook, Statute’s Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983).       
     99  Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488 (“The use of a corrective device does not, by itself, relieve 
one’s disability.  Rather, one has a disability under subsection A if, notwithstanding the 
use of a corrective device, that individual is substantially limited in a major life activity.”). 
     100  See cases cited in footnote 16, supra. 
     101  See, e.g., H. Rep. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 50 (1990) (“Whether a person has a 
disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, 
such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids.”); S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 23 
(1989) (“[W]hether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the 
availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary 
aids.”). 
     102   See, e.g.,, Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans With 
Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. REV. 27, 122-27 (2000) (critiquing Sutton’s interpretation of 
regarded as while supporting the Court’s holding on mitigating measures); Wendy 
Interpreting the ADA 
 28
statute, then by considering their eyesight as a substantial limiting 
condition United Airlines was certainly treating them as if they were.  
Why else, one might ask, was United Airlines restricting their job 
opportunities?   This argument proved too clever by half, as the saying 
goes, though it certainly had some support in the statutory language.  
However, as a practical matter, this issue was destined to fail.  If the 
Supreme Court had allowed a “regarded as” claim in this particular case, 
all of the benefits of its initial holding on the mitigating conditions would 
have been lost because once it was determined that the plaintiff was not 
disabled, she would then turn to a “regarded as” claim.  This is, in fact, 
what happened in a large number of early disability claims where 
plaintiffs frequently tagged on a regarded as claim as a safety valve.103  
Yet, just as the Court’s holding on the glasses issue was inevitable, so too 
was its interpretation of the regarded as prong, where the Court crafted the 
virtually impossible standard that an employee is regarded as disabled 
only to the extent that the employer regards her as unqualified from a 
broad class of jobs.104   
 
Although the Court’s decision has sharply limited the force of the 
regarded as prong, as a matter of discrimination, the Court’s rationale was 
not so extreme.  One of the problems with the regarded as language is that 
it has always been difficult to know what protection the provision was 
intended to provide.  The regarded as prong probably could only work in 
the context of what courts would consider the most deserving of plaintiffs 
– those who are disabled but who do not need accommodations.105  Let me 
                                                                                                                                                 
Parmet, Plain Meaning & Mitigating Measures: Judicial Interpretations of the Meaning 
of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53, 63-64, 89-90 (2000) (criticizing Court 
for restricting definition of regarded as); Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, 
Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1279, 1304-06 (2000) (critiquing 
regarded as portion of the decision). 
     103  Prior to the Court’s determination in Sutton, it was quite common for an individual 
who was found not to qualify as disabled to turn to a “regarded as” claim, although most 
of those claims failed.  See, e.g., Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 1021 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(plaintiff sought to establish regarded as claim after failing to prove he had a substantial 
limitation); Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1995) (employee on light 
duty was neither disabled nor regarded as such); Newberry v. East Texas State Univ., 161 
F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 1998)(plaintiff sought to prove his employer regarded him as disabled 
after failing to establish that his behavior qualified as disabled); Robinson v. Global 
Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35 (5th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff’s asbestosis was not a 
substantial limitation and employer did not regard individual as disabled because he had 
asbestosis).  Courts frequently treat the regarded as claim summarily and in unpublished 
opinions.  See Gibbs v. St. Anthony Hosp., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2362 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(plaintiff sought to establish employer regarded him as disabled when he failed to 
establish his lifting restrictions constituted a disability).  See also Issacharoff & Nelson, 
supra note 22, at 328 (discussing potentially circular nature of regarded as claim).          
     104  Sutton, 527 U.S, at 493.  
     105  As noted previously, there is currently a debate occurring in the lower courts 
concerning whether employers must offer accommodations to individuals who are 
regarded as disabled.  See D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, 422 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2005) 
Interpreting the ADA 
 29
offer an example from my own experience.  Shortly after the ADA was 
passed, I noticed an airline ticket agent who had one arm.  From what I 
could tell, he typed just as fast as someone with two arms, but prior to the 
ADA the airline likely would never have given him the opportunity to 
perform the job because of its perception that two arms were required for 
effective typing.  In most instances, individuals with conditions such as 
this who are treated adversely by their employers ought to succeed under 
the basic definition of disability and therefore would not need to avail 
themselves of the regarded as prong but that may not always be the 
case.106   More to the point, this is precisely the kind of condition or 
situation that the ADA was intended to address – the employer’s 
misperception of the ability of an individual with a disability.  While many 
different interests and motives lay behind the statute, a central goal was to 
overcome those misperceptions, the lack of understanding of the abilities 
of those with disabilities, and perhaps that is the best way to conceive of  
the regarded as prong.  In contrast, one would have to look far and deep to 
find any collective sense that the ADA was intended to help those who 
wear glasses overcome the stigma and travails that comes along with the 
glasses, and I think the same can be said of those with high blood pressure, 
chemical sensitivity, and the like.107   In the end, this may be a limited 
concept of what the regarded as prong was intended to encompass, but it 
seems likely the best judicial interpretation one could hope for absent a 
more pointed and specific statutory directive.    
 
In discussing the inevitability of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sutton, it is equally important to emphasize how the Court reached its 
conclusion that mitigating measures were to be considered:   the Supreme 
Court ignored statutory language, legislative history, and an EEOC 
regulatory interpretation while focusing instead on language from the 
statutory preface, which it never adequately dealt with.108  In its opinion, 
the Court emphasized the statute’s prefatory language which states that 43 
                                                                                                                                                 
(holding that employer must offer accommodations to regarded as disabled individuals 
and discussing circuit split). 
     106  The legislative history of the ADA mentioned a situation in which a child with 
Down’s syndrome was removed from a zoo so as not to upset the animals.  See H.R. No. 
101-485, 101st Cong, 2nd Sess., at 8 (1990).  This, too, seems an unusual situation for the 
regarded as prong because presumably the child would qualify as disabled under the 
statute.   The House Report also identified a severe burn victim as falling within the 
category of a physical impairment that does “not in fact result in a substantial limitation 
of a major life activity.”  Id. at 25-26 
     107  Cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 
397 (2000), arguing for an antisubordination approach though we differ in some 
significant respects on what conditions would fall within such an approach.  
     108  Both the EEOC and the Justice Department had issued regulations stating that an 
individual should be assessed in her unmitigated state, but the Court rejected that 
interpretation.  See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482 (“We conclude that Respondent is correct that 
the approach adopted by the agency guidelines – that persons are to be evaluated in their 
hypothetical uncorrected state – is an impermissible interpretation of the ADA.”).   
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million individuals were disabled, concluding that not requiring mitigating 
measures would greatly expand the statute’s coverage beyond 43 
million.109  Yet, under the Supreme Court’s interpretation, the number of 
individuals covered by the statute now certainly falls well below 43 
million since from the legislative history it was clear that Congress 
intended to include in that original number at least some individuals who 
can mitigate their disabling condition.110  Without some explanation, it is 
difficult to see how an interpretation that restricts the intended scope of the 
statute should have any priority over one that expands that scope. 
 
When statutory language is ambiguous, as it decidedly is in the 
definition of disability, without guidance from some alternative source, the 
Court will be left with its own normative vision of how the statute ought to 
be interpreted, and that is what it appears the Court accomplished in 
Sutton and the other cases discussed below.   In the case of the disabilities 
Act, the Court has frequently accomplished its statutory objective by 
rejecting administrative interpretations.  Relevant to the Sutton case, the 
EEOC and the Justice Department had both promulgated regulations 
directing that the determination of whether an individual is disabled 
should exclude mitigating measures. 111          
From this perspective, Sutton is surely a paradigmatic example of the 
Court’s selective use of statutory construction tools.  Indeed, in Sutton, 
one can plausibly claim that the Court focused on irrelevant language at 
the expense of more clear language and clear legislative history, and 
disregarded agency interpretations along the way in order to read the 
statute consistent with its own normative vision.  Although this is hardly 
an example of neutral reasoning, it was highly predictable nevertheless.112    
 
B.  Exposing the Limits of the Backlash Thesis. 
 
1.  Williams v. Toyota Mfg.   Another case that has come in for 
considerable scholarly criticism, Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., was 
decided shortly after Sutton and fits within the framework described above 
of a fully predictable judicial result, and one that again has narrowed the 
scope of the statute.113  Unlike the Sutton case which presented a terrible 
                                                 
     109  Id. at 484.   
     110  In his dissent, Justice Stevens criticized this aspect of the majority’s opinion.  See 
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 498 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
     111  See note 107 supra. 
     112  Jim Brudney and Corey Ditsler make a similar argument with considerable focus 
on the Sutton decision.  The authors conclude their study by noting:  “[T]he Court’s 
reliance on canon-based reasoning can seem plausible and ‘objective’ under one set of 
conditions, unpredictable and inconsistent in a second setting, and strategically or 
ideologically driven in a third. . . ”  James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslar, Canons of 
Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 112 
(2005). 
     113  Toyota Motor Manuf. Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
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test case, the carpal tunnel syndrome at issue in Williams was bound to 
make its way to the Supreme Court and was an issue that had to be 
resolved.  Ella Williams worked on the assembly line at a Toyota plant, 
and like many individuals working in similar positions, she suffered 
injuries to her hands, arm, and wrist from the repetitive motion of the line.  
Toyota’s own doctor diagnosed Williams with carpal tunnel syndrome and 
placed her on permanent work restrictions.114  For the next two years, 
Williams worked on modified light duty but still missed some work, and 
she ultimately filed a workers’ compensation claim that the parties settled.  
Williams was then assigned to a quality control line where she worked 
without problem for another two years until she was required to rotate 
through all of the various job tasks, which included certain manual tasks 
she could not perform without significant pain.  At this point, she was 
again placed on work restrictions and the employer later terminated her 
purportedly for her poor attendance.115 
 
The Williams case fell at the ill-defined intersection of three 
different statutes:  workers’ compensation, long-term disability under 
social security and the ADA.  From an institutional standpoint, the idea 
that carpal tunnel syndrome is generally not covered by the ADA fits the 
Supreme Court’s interests in two distinct ways.  First, carpal tunnel 
syndrome is typically a work-related injury, and would generally be 
covered under the more limited workers’ compensation system, which 
provides a no-fault scheme for injuries suffered in the course of 
employment and does so by providing limited statutory remedies for the 
injuries in state administrative forums.116  Just as the Court was hesitant to 
open the door to nontraditional disabilities in Sutton, the Court was also 
understandably reluctant to turn the ADA into an alternative forum for 
workers’ compensation claims, not just because it would prefer to keep the 
cases out of federal courts but also because allowing such claims would 
eviscerate the exclusivity of workers compensation.117   
                                                 
     114  Id. at 187. 
     115  Id. at 188-89. 
     116  Because workers’ compensation provides limited remedies, as part of the no-fault 
bargain, many employers tell their employees to file workers’ compensation claims at the 
first sign of carpal tunnel syndrome as a way of limiting their exposure.  Ergonomics 
injuries comprise a substantial portion of compensation claims.  See Orly Lobel, 
Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of the Workplace, 
ADMIN. L. REV., 1071, 1095-97 (2005) (discussing ergonomics in context of workers’ 
compensation).   
     117  Now Chief Justice Roberts emphasized this point towards the end of the brief he 
filed on behalf of Toyota Motors.  See Brief of Petitioner, at 18 (noting that the lower 
court’s decision “upsets the statute’s interaction with workers’ compensation laws.”).   At 
oral argument, the second question that came from the Court involved the relationship 
between workers’ compensation and the ADA, and the issue reappeared throughout the 
argument.   As a general matter, when an employee is injured on the job, she is able to 
obtain prompt relief from the workers’ compensation scheme.  While certainly not 
without its problems, that scheme represents a deliberate and careful compromise in that 
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The second factor counseling against ADA coverage of carpal 
tunnel syndrome relates back to what I earlier discussed as the concerns of 
business.  Carpal tunnel syndrome is among those ergonomic injuries that 
the business community fought so strongly against for years, including by 
blocking the development of an ergonomics standard in the Department of 
Labor.118  Those efforts were led by Eugene Scalia, one of the many sons 
of Justice Scalia, who cut his teeth as a labor lawyer by becoming one of 
the most prominent critics of the presence of ergonomic injuries – a task 
that earned him the brief reward of Labor Department solicitor.119  Given 
the controversy surrounding ergonomics injuries, it seems likely that at 
least some members of the Court would greet the issue of carpal tunnel 
syndrome with skepticism, while others would have seen the case as 
potentially transforming the ADA into an alternative form of workers’ 
compensation, something the Court was clearly unwilling to do.  In the 
context of the judicial backlash story, it is worth emphasizing that the 
Supreme Court decision in Williams was unanimous.           
 
Most of the criticism of the Williams decision ignores the workers’ 
compensation aspect of the case to focus on the Court’s restrictive 
interpretation of the statute, which now requires individuals to establish 
that they are limited in performing tasks that are of “central importance to 
most people’s lives.”120  This restriction has forced courts into  awkward 
inquiries concerning whether individuals are capable of brushing their 
teeth or hugging their spouses in order to determine whether they are 
disabled.121  While this inquiry has led to excluding some individuals who 
                                                                                                                                                 
the employee does not have to prove the employer was at fault, and in return the remedies 
are quite limited.   The remedy is also exclusive; in other words, it is generally easy for 
an employee who is injured on the job to get into the system but it is intentionally very 
difficult to get out of the established compensation scheme.        
     118  See MARION CRAIN, PAULINE KIM & MICHAEL SELMI, WORK LAW 926-27 (2005) 
(discussing battle over ergonomics standards).  
     119  See Christopher Marquis, Bush Bypasses Senate on 2 More Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 12, 2002, at A1 (noting that Eugene Scalia who had previously denounced 
ergonomics as “quackery” had received a recess appointment).  Since I emphasized the 
workers’ compensation aspects of the case that were included in the briefs and arguments, 
I should note that at the oral argument, there was no discussion relating to the nature of 
carpal tunnel syndrome, although the issue was raised specifically in the amicus brief 
filed on behalf of the petitioner by Levi Strauss.   
     120  Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198.  For criticisms of the case see Kathleen Hale, Toyota v. 
Williams’ Further Constricting the Circle of Difference, 4 J. L. & SOC’Y 275 (2003); 
Jeffrey W. Larroca, Toyota Motor Manuf., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams: Disabling the 
Americans With Disabilities Act, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH & POL’Y 363 (2002).   
     121   See, e.g., Nuzum v. Ozark Auto Distrib., 432 F.3d 839, 846 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(considering but not deciding whether hugging was a major life activity); Guzman-
Rosario v. UPS, 397 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2005) (plaintiff’s ovarian cysts did not interfere with 
sitting down or doing housework); Heiko v. Colombo Savings Bank, 434 F.3d 249 (4th 
Cir. 2006) (elimination of waste was a major life function); Rooney v. Koch Air, Inc., 
410 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 2005) (individual was not disabled because able to crawl and bend); 
McGeshick v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2004) (working in stairwells and 
cleaning ledges was not a major life activity).  A substantial number of cases, with 
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were likely intended to be covered by the ADA, the case is a natural 
extension of the concerns addressed in Sutton.  The Court’s decision in 
Sutton was necessary to keep anyone with a medical condition the 
employer sought to consider from raising a “regarded as” claim; it was 
necessary in Williams to restrict the definition of major life activity so as 
to close the workers’ compensation door.  Reminiscent of its decision in 
Sutton, reaching its conclusion in Williams, required the Court to disregard 
an EEOC guidance and more logical textual analysis as the price of 
ensuring there was “a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.”122  
Despite the Court’s circuitous path, there is little question that its decision 
was ultimately consistent with the purpose of the ADA, which no one 
could plausibly contend was intended to supplant workers’ compensation 
or to allow those with work-related injuries to seek accommodations in 
addition to the remedies available under workers’ compensation.123    
 
2.  Chevron v. Echazabal.  Two other cases deserve mention within 
the framework of this article.  In Chevron v. Echazabal, the question was 
whether the statutory language that permitted employers to restrict actions 
when an employee posed a danger to others could be stretched to include 
danger to oneself. 124   The case posed an unusual situation because 
Echazabal had a serious illness (Hepatitis C) and Chevron contended that 
allowing him to continue working would pose a risk to his life.  Most 
individuals in these circumstances would not want to continue working, 
and it seems, on the merits alone, the Supreme Court would likely side 
with the employer who was engaging in paternalistic rather than obviously 
discriminatory actions.  Yet, of the cases discussed in this paper, 
Echazabal presented the most difficult path for the Court to reach its 
desired result, namely that employers could exclude individuals who 
posed a danger to their own health.   
 
The Court’s path was tortured because the language of the 
statutory affirmative defense at issue in the case did not say anything 
about posing a risk to oneself, specifically mentioning only “a direct threat 
to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”125  An EEOC 
regulation supported Chevron’s interpretation, but having just ignored 
EEOC regulations in Sutton and Williams, one might have thought the 
Court would be constrained to again disregard the regulation, particularly 
                                                                                                                                                 
conflicting results, have involved interpersonal skills raising the question whether getting 
along with others or belonging is a major life activity.  For an analysis of these cases and 
advocating a broad approach see Ann Hubbard, The Major Life Activity of Belonging, 39 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217 (2004).  
     122  Sutton, at 197. 
     123   This latter point is perhaps more controversial  One might arguably maintain that 
the accommodation provision of the ADA should enable one otherwise unable to work 
due to a workplace injury to return to employment in some more limited capacity.     
     124 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002).  
     125  42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). 
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given that the statutory language was unequivocal.  In other words, if the 
Court were true to the statutory language, and to its prior interpretive 
methodology, it should have ruled in favor of Echazabal by holding that 
the EEOC regulation was in conflict with the statutory language.  A 
second, and in some ways even more problematic, hurdle was the parallel 
to the Court’s earlier decision in Johnson Controls, where the Supreme 
Court had invalidated an employer’s practice of excluding women from a 
battery making facility as a way to protect their fetuses from lead 
exposure.126   A central premise of Johnson Controls was that women 
should be able to choose for themselves how to protect their bodies and 
potential fetuses, and in many ways it seemed an easier determination that 
employees should be able to decide whether they wanted to continue 
working knowing the risks the work presented to their own health.  As a 
matter of expressed judicial policy, and clear statutory language, 
Echazabal should have prevailed but that was not to be.127 
 
In its unanimous decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the 
parallel to Johnson Controls in a footnote,128 and also had little trouble 
finding that the employer’s actions were permissible.   Equally clear, the 
Court’s decision evinced a paternalistic attitude, an attitude that has long 
prevailed when it comes to the disabled and one that demonstrates that, 
certainly to the Court, disability discrimination is different from 
discrimination based on gender or race, or the other traditional categories.  
This latter point ties into the lack of a social movement on disability, as it 
suggests that we have failed to move the debate forward regarding the 
treatment of those with disabilities, and instead remain locked in what 
should be an outdated viewpoint.  In the Echazabal case, not even clear 
statutory language made a difference --  the Supreme Court instead chose 
to follow the EEOC interpretive guideline after having rejected similar 
guidelines in Sutton and Williams. 
 
3.  Bragdon v. Abbott.  This leads to the final case I want to 
highlight to show how the Supreme Court has interpreted the ADA 
consistent with broad social norms.129  Bragdon v. Abbott has been one of 
the few notable successes in the Supreme Court, a case in which the Court 
found that an asymptomatic HIV-positive individual was covered by the 
                                                 
     126   In’tl UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
     127  The case is analyzed by Professor Sam Bagenstos, who was counsel to Echazabal 
in the Supreme Court, in Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, the Americans With 
Disabilities Act, and Rational Discrimination, 55 ALABAMA L. REV. 923 (2004). 
     128  Echazabal,  536 U.S, at n.5. 
     129  The one case that does not necessarily fit within this schema is Cleveland v. Policy 
Mgt. Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), where the Court held that it was possible that 
an individual could be disabled for the purposes of obtaining Social Security Disability 
Insurance and therefore unable to “engage in gainful work” while simultaneously 
pursuing a claim under the ADA.  What was perhaps most surprising about this decision 
is that it was unanimous, as was true for Echazabal and Toyota Motor Manuf.     
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statute because she was limited in the major life activity of procreation.130  
Although on the surface it may seem obvious that someone who is HIV-
positive should be treated as disabled, it was not such an easy conclusion 
given that the statute requires the individual be limited in a major life 
activity and one definition of being asymptomatic is that an individual is 
not so limited.  As a way of bringing the claim within the statute, the court 
defined reproduction as a “major life activity,” and did so based on agency 
interpretations, experience under the Rehab Act, and an opinion by the 
Office of Legal Counsel.131  Although the Court’s decision is intuitively 
appealing, it creates some curious theoretical difficulties in cases 
involving menopausal women or others who are not capable of 
reproducing.132  At the same time, the Court’s decision seems entirely 
consistent with Congressional intent and broader social norms, which 
almost certainly would find those who were HIV-positive as among the 
group that ought to be protected by the disability laws.133       
 
IV.  UNDERSTANDING THE EVOLUTION OF THE ADA. 
 
To this point, I have been telling a story that serves primarily as a 
counter story to the prevailing theme of judicial backlash.  As just 
discussed, there is little question that the Supreme Court has narrowed the 
scope of the statute, and I have suggested it has done so to bring the statute 
in line with broad social norms regarding what ought to be defined as a 
disability.  The Court has accomplished this feat without substantial regard 
for legislative intent, or a principled approach to statutory interpretation 
but in doing so appears to have drafted a statute Congress prefers as 
evident by its failure to override the judicial interpretations, or more 
specifically by the lack of any effort to override those interpretations.  In 
this section, I want to explore what additional lessons the case study might 
present regarding statutory interpretation, and the limits of seeking social 
change through litigation.  Although one must always be cautious about 
drawing broad conclusions from a single case study, the evolution of the 
ADA provides keen insights into the Court’s methodologies and how it 
can impose its own preferences – preferences that will often follow, rather 
than transform those social norms.     
 
                                                 
     130  Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).  
     131  Id. at 638-46. 
     132  Mark Kelman has noted the potential absurdity of the Court’s interpretation, which 
might mean that a menopausal woman would not be covered by the statute and the 
Court’s analysis required it to ignore the fact that the dentist would have refused to treat 
someone who had full-blown AIDS.  See Mark Kelman, DOES DISABILITY STATUS 
MATTER?, IN AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW 
FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 91 (L. Pickering Francis & A. Silvers eds. 2000).  
     133  It also followed from the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in School Board of 
Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
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A.  Can the Court’s Approach Be Reconciled With Theories 
of   Statutory  Interpretation?  
 
 1.  Normative Theories of Interpretation.  The ADA poses a 
particularly difficult challenge for the reigning theories of statutory 
interpretation.  Within contemporary legal debates, the various theories of 
interpretation can be roughly divided into two camps, the textualists who 
emphasize the statutory text and eschew dependence on legislative history, 
and the intentionalists who prefer methods of interpretation designed to 
divine the intent of Congress and are far more willing to probe into 
legislative materials beyond the statutory text.  The last decade has seen a 
lively debate arise over the merits of the two approaches,134 but in the 
context of the ADA, neither approach provides a satisfactory means of 
interpreting the statute, leaving courts to their own normative framework 
to define the scope of the statute. 
  
The goal of textualists is to arrive at an objective intent embodied 
in the words of the statute as reasonably understood by an observer given 
the context of the statute’s passage.135  As should be evident from the 
statutory language discussed earlier, an interpretation based on the 
reasonable understanding of the text is likely to run aground quickly – no 
one would think to define disability as a “substantial limitation on a major 
life activity,” and even if someone did, each word would still require 
interpretation.  Similarly, the ambiguity present throughout the text cannot 
easily be resolved by any objective practices, such as a turn to a dictionary 
or various canons of construction.  In Sutton, the Court resorted to a 
grammatical construction of the statute, and while its interpretation was 
plausible, other interpretations were equally plausible.  Indeed, the Justice 
Department and the EEOC both read the same language differently 
without resorting primarily to legislative history.136   
  
Intentionalists would not fare much better.  Even though the 
legislative history provided some answers to general questions – 
                                                 
     134  The literature is expansive and most of it is centered on normative considerations.  
As is widely recognized, Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook are the best known judicial 
proponents of a textualist method, and their arguments have been extremely influential.  
Among academics, John Manning has emerged as the leading defender of textualism.  A 
good summary of the debate and the purported differences between textualism and 
intentionalism can be found in Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 
(2005), though Nelson argues that the two camps are not as different as their various 
proponents state.   In this section, I will use the term intentionalism, which seems 
currently to be the most common contrast to textualism, whereas others might use 
purposivism.  For an argument similar to Nelson’s but that invokes purposivism see 
Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2006).    
     135 See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 421 
(2005) (“Textualists thus aspire ‘to read the words of [a statutory] text as any ordinary 
Member of Congress would have read them, and apply the meaning so determined.’”).   
     136  See earlier discussion re Sutton.   
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particularly on the mitigating measures issue – it failed to address, and 
ultimately left open, most of the difficult specific questions.  Some earlier 
versions of intentionalism required courts to ask how Congress would 
have addressed the issues that later emerged,137 and it would have been 
very difficult to apply the general answers found in the legislative history 
to the specific problems that have arisen.  For example, although Congress 
suggested that an individual ought to be assessed in his or her unmitigated 
state, it almost certainly did not mean to include individuals who wear 
glasses within that determination.  More likely, had they considered the 
issue with more care, Congress would have concluded that mitigating 
measures should only be disregarded when assessing individuals with 
traditional, or serious, disabilities.138  But that is, at best, just a guess, and 
even if Congress had made that determination, there would still have been 
a question how to define a serious, or traditional, disability, thus leaving 
substantial discretion for judicial interpretation.  A similar analysis would 
apply to carpal tunnel syndrome, and canvassing the legislative history 
provides no definitive answer to whether workplace injuries were intended 
to be covered or whether they ought to be left to the workers’ 
compensation remedial scheme.  
 
 One reason both of the common interpretive approaches fail to 
yield results is that both approaches assume there is some discoverable 
legislative intent either from the text or other legislative materials.139   
However, with the ADA, it is a mistake to assume there was any such 
intent other than in a most general way.  If one were to ask members of 
Congress what they intended when they passed the ADA, the vast majority 
would have been unable to say anything more than that they intended to 
prohibit discrimination based on disability.  If they were pressed to offer 
an opinion on what they meant by disability, virtually none would have 
been able to offer a reliable answer, and instead would likely have pointed 
to the sponsors as offering an authoritative guide.   
                                                 
     137  This approach is sometimes referred to as imaginative reconstruction and it is tied 
to older theories of interpretation designed to further Congressional purpose.  See Richard 
A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation – in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 800, 817 (1983) (“I suggest that the task for the judge called upon to interpret a 
statute is best described as one of imaginative reconstruction.  The judge should try to 
think his way as best he can into the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how 
they would have wanted the statute applied to the case at bar.”). 
     138  This was a position staked out by the Fifth Circuit prior to the Court’s decision in 
Sutton.  See Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that only some impairments should be evaluated in their uncorrected state).   
     139  Textualists typically eschew any notion of a collective congressional intent, but 
they do believe that legislative intent can be discerned from the language and other 
objective practices.  See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 419424 (2005) (“Textualists . . . deny that Congress has a collective will apart from 
the outcomes of the complex legislative process that conditions its ability to translate raw 
policy impulses or intentions into finished legislation.”).   
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 From this perspective, relying on legislative history might be most 
consistent with congressional intent.  Dan Rodriguez and Barry Weingast 
have developed a theory of statutory interpretation that emphasizes the 
important role played by pivotal legislators in ensuring passage of 
legislation.140  They focus in particular on the critical role conservative 
Democrats played in ensuring the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
to  suggest that the views of those legislators, rather than the views of the 
bill’s sponsors, provide the best guide to legislative intent.141  This theory 
is premised on a better, and more realistic, view of Congress than most 
theories of statutory interpretation, but it remains problematic from a 
variety of perspectives.  Perhaps the most significant limitation surrounds 
defining pivotal legislators – while Rodriguez and Weingast typically look 
to the final legislators who sign onto legislation, relying on the 
interpretation of those last legislators may neglect the view of the more 
liberal legislators who may have declined to support legislation that only 
went as far as that supported by the most conservative members.142  In any 
event, turning the theory upside down, when a bill has no substantial 
opposition, the views of the sponsors might be the best evidence of 
legislative intent if for no other reason than that the other members of 
Congress would likely have no developed views.  Yet, in the case of the 
ADA, focusing on the views of the bill’s sponsors would not have 
provided much more than a general directive, and that directive would 
have suggested little more than that the statute ought to be construed 
broadly to further the statute’s remedial goals.143   
 
 Although the primary methods of statutory interpretation wound 
fail to provide  any conclusive answers, it might be argued that the Court’s 
decisions are consistent with interpretive theories that emphasize the role 
of social norms or public values.  William Eskridge has, for example, 
highlighted the importance of public values in giving meaning to 
ambiguous statutory language, though he has also sounded a cautionary 
                                                 
     140  See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of 
Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its Interpretation, 
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Paradox 
of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations, forthcoming NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY 
L.REV. (2006) (available on ssrn.com).  
     141  Rodriguez & Weingast, Postive Political Theory, supra note [139], at 1428.  
     142  For example, President Johnson brought substantial pressure to bear on a number 
of critical Southern legislators.  It is not always clear, however, that the support of what 
Rodriguez and Weingast label pivotal legislators turned on particular interpretations of 
the Act, as often the President offered support on other projects in return for support of 
the Civil Rights legislation.  See  NICK KOTZ, JUDGMENT DAYS: LYNDON BAINES 
JOHNSON, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE LAWS THAT CHANGED AMERICA (2005).        
     143  At one time, the Supreme Court adopted a similar view and often interpreted civil 
rights legislation consistent with its remedial purpose.  See, e.g., Zipes v. TWA, 455 U.S. 
385 (1982) (emphasizing the importance of the remedial purpose of Title VII in 
interpreting filing deadlines); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) 
(defining back pay as central to the remedial purposes of Title VII).      
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note about the limits of such an approach.144  In Professor Eskridge’s 
model, it is inappropriate for courts to “use[] public values analysis to 
displace an apparent legislative decision that has not been overtaken by 
changed circumstances.” 145   At the time he was writing, Professor 
Eskridge seemed to assume that incorporating public values into statutory 
analysis would likely broaden remedial statutes, and the cases he 
championed as models of public value reasoning were those in which civil 
rights, or other important liberal values, were ultimately upheld.146  The 
Court’s decisions on the ADA, and its statutory approach, would be 
difficult to reconcile with Eskridge’s theory; in fact, he specifically 
condemned judicial efforts to rewrite statutes while ignoring clear 
language or other legislative materials.147    
 
 The Court’s implicit emphasis on social norms might also be seen 
as consistent with a textualist approach to interpretation.  A central precept 
of the textualist method is that a court ought to define statutory terms 
based on common understandings.148  Given that the Supreme Court has 
largely defined disability consistent with existing social norms, it might 
appear that the Court’s method is, in fact, a principled textualist approach.  
This argument, however, neglects the specific textual words – “a 
substantial limitation on a major life activity” – and would allow the 
Supreme Court to substitute a common sense definition for the specific 
statutory text.  This might be a reasonable approach for the Court to take 
but it is a difficult one to reconcile with an emphasis on the actual written 
text.  In other words, the Court’s approach might be defined as textualist if 
                                                 
     144  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1007 (1989).  See also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 148-51 (1994) (discussing role of public values in theories of 
interpretation). 
     145   Eskridge, Public Values, supra note [144], at 1010.   
     146  For example, the case Eskridge cites as paradigmatic of the best use of public 
values is Bob Jones University v. United States, where the Supreme Court upheld the 
government’s denial of tax exempt status to the university because of its racial policies.  
See Eskridge, Public Values, supra at 1035-36.  In contrast, Eskridge was critical of 
several Supreme Court decisions that were inconsistent with liberal outcomes.  Id. at 
1066 (criticizing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop).    
     147  Eskridge writes, “The most controversial public values decisions are those where 
the result ‘rewrites’ the statute and  negates clearly expressed legislative expectations that 
have not been undone by substantially changed conditions.”  Id. at 1066 (emphasis in 
original). 
     148   Professor John Manning, the most prominent academic textualist, writes:  
“[M]odern textualists acknowledge that language has meaning only in context . . .[T]hey 
believe that statutory language, like all language, conveys meaning only because a 
linguistic community attaches common understandings to words and phrases, and relies 
on shared conventions for deciphering those words and phrases in particular contexts.”  
John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 108-09 
(2001). 
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the statute sought to “protect the disabled,”149 leaving those terms to be 
defined through litigation based on broad social norms, but the statute, 
particularly as illuminated by the legislative history, offered a far different 
textual definition.           
 
2. Positive Political Theory.  
 
If the particular normative theories of statutory interpretation prove 
unhelpful, another theory steeped in positive political theory (“PPT”) 
might provide some insight into the Court’s decisions.  Although there are 
variations of the PPT approach, all models identify the Supreme Court as a 
strategic actor that is intent on implementing its own policy preferences.150  
Those preferences are most commonly defined as political in nature but 
there is no particular reason those preferences need to be limited to policy 
issues,151 and institutional preferences have likely had a greater influence 
on the Court’s approach to the ADA than particular policy preferences.  
The idea behind PPT is that the Supreme Court is engaged in a strategic 
game with Congress, and to a lesser extent the President, to impose its 
preferences without later having those preferences overruled or modified.   
To keep from being overruled, the Court must stay within a policy range 
that will be respected by the existing Congress or the gatekeeping 
Congressional Committee, or which will be of sufficient importance to the 
President to justify a veto.  An important aspect of this theory is that, in 
making its strategic decisions, the Court looks to the preferences of the 
existing Congress as opposed to those of the enacting Congress.152  Within 
law, Professor William Eskridge has developed the model most 
extensively with a particular focus on the civil rights decisions that 
prompted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as an indication, in part, how the 
Supreme Court played the game poorly given that its decisions were 
                                                 
     149  A common example of this methodology is found in the antitrust field where 
courts have applied common law reasoning to give meaning to the broad statutory 
language. 
     150  A good summary of the theory is found in McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A 
Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1636 
(1995) where the authors write, “The core assumption of the argument in this Article is 
that all of the relevant actors – elected politicians and judges – act rationally to bring 
policy as close as possible to their own preferred outcome.”  See also Jeffrey A. Segal, 
Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, AMER. POLI. 
SCI. REV. 28 (1997); John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of 
Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT’L REV. LAW & ECON. 263 (1992).   
      151  See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 546-47 
(1998) (book review) (“Nothing in the concept of judicial strategy requires the 
assumption that Justices are exclusive maximizers of their policy preferences . . . Far 
more plausible is the position that judges are concerned with a variety of ends, including 
ideological policy.”). 
     152  See Ferejohn & Weingast, supra note 149, at 270 (noting that under a positive 
theory “the preference configuration of the current legislature is far more important for 
the results of statutory interpretation than is that of the enacting legislation”).  
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subsequently, and relatively quickly, overruled.153  The assumptions that 
fuel Eskridge’s model, and those developed by others, are many and the 
analytical results often limited. 154   Nevertheless, the model has been 
influential within legal scholarship and is a variant of other models 
developed within political science that are gaining increased attention.155  
On at least a surface level, the PPT model offers considerable appeal for 
understanding the Court’s methodology.   
 
The Supreme Court’s decisions have typically narrowed the scope 
of the ADA by redefining the core concept of disability, and the Court has 
done so in a way that is clearly contrary to the more expansive approach 
adopted by the enacting Congress.  And, in terms of a game, the Supreme 
Court has guessed right:  Congress has not sought to overturn its decisions 
so that the Court’s policy preferences have, for the time being, been 
solidified.  Yet, there are at least two primary difficulties in relying on this 
strategic theory to explain the Court’s ADA decisions.  First, many of the 
controversial judicial decisions have been unanimous and given the 
ideological diversity of the Court, it seems unlikely that the Justices would 
be unanimous at least in their political preferences.  They might, however, 
be unanimous in their institutional preferences, in particular in their desire 
not to displace workers’ compensation remedies, or perhaps more 
specifically not to transform the federal courts into workers’ compensation 
forums, or to increase substantially the disability caseload.  The Justices 
might also be in substantial agreement that those who wear glasses, suffer 
from high blood pressure, or other relatively minor conditions should not 
be defined as disabled, but that only suggests that the Court would desire 
to rewrite the statute, and would not necessarily explain any particular 
strategic considerations, unless there was reason to believe Congress 
intended those conditions to be covered.   
 
This leads to the second concern with relying on PPT to explain 
the Court’s decisions.  As noted previously, Congress sharply rebuked the 
Supreme Court with the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which was passed at about 
the same time as the ADA, and under a PPT approach one would expect 
the Supreme Court to react to that statute by curtailing its preference-
impositions in light of an expected Congressional rebuke.  In fact, this is 
what has largely occurred with Title VII, where over the last decade a 
chastened Supreme Court has issued a series of decisions that have 
                                                 
     153  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the 
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613 (1991).  Although 
the referenced article most directly relates to a discussion of the ADA, Professor Eskridge 
developed his argument through a series of articles that were later incorporated into a 
book.  See EskKRIDGE, supra note 144.  
     154  For a balanced but skeptical review see Jeffrey A. Segal, supra note 150.  
     155  For a comprehensive overview of the political science literature see POSITIVE 
THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS (K. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast eds. 
1995). 
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advanced the interests of plaintiffs and which are clearly contrary in spirit 
to the rulings that prompted the 1991 Act.156  But simultaneous with its 
restrained interpretations of Title VII, the Court began to emasculate the 
ADA, and just to make sure Congress noticed, it took three cases in one 
Term and slashed them all.157   From this perspective it is difficult to 
explain why the Supreme Court would act in a restrained fashion with 
Title VII while interpreting the ADA narrowly and contrary to 
congressional intent.                           
 
Staying within Eskridge’s model, one might conclude that the 
Court made a judgment that Congress was unlikely to care about the ADA 
whereas Congress had clearly demonstrated its commitment to the 
interests of Title VII.  While plausible, this seems highly unlikely as a 
strategic matter, though, again, it has turned out largely to be true.  Yet, 
there would have been no significant basis for such a conclusion, other 
than perhaps looking at the sloppy language of the statute.  The ADA 
passed with overwhelming support, typically a sign of strong 
congressional interest rather than disinterest, and the statute was 
purposefully broad in its scope.  It is also unlikely that the Supreme Court 
would have such a strong contrary policy preference with respect to 
disabilities, or strong enough to risk Congressional rebuke in the same 
manner that had occurred with Title VII.158    
                                                 
     156  In retrospect, there have been a surprising number of such decisions, many of 
which were unanimous reversals of lower courts on rather straightforward issues.  See, 
e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235 (2006) (unanimous decision finding that 
the number of employees was not a matter of subject matter jurisdiction); Ash v. Tyson 
Foods, 126 S.Ct. 1195 (2006) (unanimously and summarily reversing 11th Circuit 
standard on pretext and test for direct evidence); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 
(2002) (unanimously rejecting heightened pleading standard for employment 
discrimination cases);  Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (unanimous 
decision holding the term “employee” includes former employees); Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Serv., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (unanimously approving of same-sex harassment 
theory); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) 
(unanimously rejected pretext-plus theory).  The Supreme Court’s series of sovereign 
immunity decisions might be seen as inconsistent with a positive portrayal, but upon 
reflection those cases fit the Court’s scheme.  Although the Supreme Court held that the 
Eleventh Amendment barred enforcement of the ADA and the age discrimination statute 
against state entities, both of those statutes are subjected to rational basis review under 
the constitution.  In contrast, when the Court moved to the Family and Medical Leave 
Act, which it treated as a gender-based statute, and thus subject to an intermediate level 
of scrutiny, the Court held that application to the states was consistent with the Eleventh 
Amendment.  See Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v.  Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) 
(upholding application of FMLA to states); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 
(2000) (holding that Congress had exceeded its authority in applying ADEA to the states); 
Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (same with respect to ADA).  Most 
recently the Court held that Title II of the ADA could be applied against the states.  See 
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).      
     157   Sutton, Albertson’s and Murphy were all issued on the same day. 
     158  Focusing on institutional concerns might explain a contrary preference, if what the 
Court was primarily concerned about was a rising caseload devoted to disabilities claims.  
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Within the PPT model, the focus would be on the Congress in 
place when the decisions were issued, which was decidedly more 
conservative than the enacting Congress, and in narrowing the scope of the 
statute, the Court has moved closer to the position originally staked out by 
a small group of conservative members of Congress.159  Shifting the focus 
to the contemporaneous Congress, however, does not solve the puzzle of 
the differing approach to Title VII.  Presumably, a more conservative 
Congress would  welcome narrower interpretations of civil rights statutes 
across the board, and there is no reason to think they would desire narrow 
interpretations of the ADA but broad interpretations of Title VII.160  One 
possible explanation would emphasize the different stages of statutory 
evolution  – the Court’s interpretations of the ADA concentrate on core 
issues whereas Title VII is at a more mature stage of development with 
more tangential issues to be resolved.  This interpretation might explain 
some of the Court’s more limited interpretations under Title VII, but it 
would not explain most of its recent expansive decisions including the 
decision last Term to adopt a broad interpretation of retaliation even in a 
case where the interpretation was unnecessary to the outcome of the 
case.161                 
 
Changing the focus of the strategic interaction to the Court’s 
institutional interests, combined with the lack of a prominent social 
movement regarding disability may help explain what the Court has 
accomplished, and why it has done so.   As noted earlier, there is simply 
no way to identify the Court’s decisions as consistent with any principled 
method of interpretation:  the Court adopts EEOC interpretations when 
they support the decision and ignores them when they do not, and these 
are interpretations from the very same agency operating under the very 
                                                                                                                                                 
Yet, during this same time period, Title VII claims tripled and this sharp increase in cases 
did not prompt restrictive interpretations.  See Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private 
Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 
1401 (1998) (discussing increase in employment caseload).     
     159  The House shifted from Democratic to Republican-control with the 1994 elections, 
and many of the new members were quite conservative.  For one of the many books 
chronicling the changeover see NICOL C. RAE, CONSERVATIVE REFORMERS: THE 
REPUBLICAN FRESHMAN AND THE LESSONS OF THE 104TH CONGRESS (1998).     
     160  Similarly, if the Supreme Court was weighing the preferences of the current 
Congress when it issued its decisions, it might have taken the opportunity to render 
restrictive interpretations of Title VII so as to preserve its decisions that were overturned 
in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.     
     161  Burlington Northern v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006) (unanimously adopting 
broad definition of retaliation even though plaintiff had prevailed in lower court on more 
restrictive definition).   Several years earlier, in Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 
(2003), the Supreme Court unanimously held that the mixed motives theory, in which a 
plaintiff can prevail by establishing that an illegitimate motive was a substantial 
motivating factor in an employment decision, was not limited to cases of direct evidence.  
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), Justice O’Connor had written an 
influential concurring opinion stating that the theory should only be available in cases 
that involved direct evidence.   
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same congressional authorization.  The Court emphasizes statutory 
language and sentence structure in some cases but turns its eye on clear 
language in others, and yet all of the decisions appear to be consistent with 
broad social norms and institutional concerns.  While there is very little 
helpful empirical data on the specific questions, it seems fair to suggest 
that most people would not define those who wear glasses or who have 
high blood pressure as disabled, at least in any broad sense, just as it is 
likely true that most individuals would agree that those who are HIV-
positive should be defined as disabled.  Institutionally, the Court has a 
strong interest in not opening the federal litigation doors to workers’ 
compensation claims, which are otherwise confined to lowly 
administrative courts, and at least some members of the Court likely have 
a political policy preference to limit the number of claims employers are 
likely to face.  But it is important to emphasize that the Supreme Court 
decisions are not simply the product of a conservative Court seeking to 
trump legislative preferences with its own policy preferences.  Rather, the 
Court has reconstructed the statute consistent with broad norms of 
protections society would provide; it is perhaps the statute Congress 
should have written, and would have written if there had been pressure to 
do so. 
 
B.  The Importance and Absence of a Social Movement. 
 
Although the Court’s interpretations may bring the statute closer to 
the policy preferences of the current Congress, 162  the real freedom to 
rewrite the statute did not come from Congressional preferences, or the 
lack thereof, but the absence of any social movement demanding 
legislative changes.  Congress is not likely to move to overturn judicial 
decisions without significant pressure from interest groups, and that is 
particularly true with the ADA given that the Court’s decisions have 
generally favored the business community, which lost out in the original 
statutory play but which remains a strong legislative force.  In the context 
of the ADA, there is simply no substantial lobbying force to push statutory 
                                                 
     162  Whether the Court has, in fact, moved closer to the preferences of the current 
Congress is difficult to know without some tangible evidence of those preferences, 
especially in light of the strong support among Republicans the original legislation 
received.  It is perhaps more accurate to suggest that the Court has moved closest to the 
preferences of those minority members of Congress who opposed the ADA but that, too, 
is a difficult estimation to make.  Professor Einer Elhauge has recently advocated an 
approach to statutory interpretation that emphasizes tracking current legislative 
preferences over those of the enacting legislature.  See Einer Elhauge, Preference-
Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002).   Like Bill 
Eskridge’s dynamic theory discussed earlier, Elhauge’s theory seems best suited for 
updating older statutes rather than interpreting contemporary ones.  Indeed, Elhauge’s 
theory would be difficult to implement any time Congress alters its political balance, as it 
can easily do every two years.  For a perceptive critique of Elhauge’s theory see Amanda 
L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 1389 
(2005).     
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reform, and that will remain true so long as the Court does not carve out 
traditional disabilities from the statutory scope, where there is a 
sympathetic lobbying force.                
  
This leads to one final lesson to be drawn from this case study 
regarding the importance of social movements.  The last few years have 
seen a surge of interest within legal scholarship regarding the importance 
of social movements in the pursuit of equality.  Traditionally the social 
movement literature has identified legal action as in tension with social 
change, with law frequently seen as disruptive to more meaningful 
political action.163   More recently, legal scholars have emphasized the 
interrelation between effective social movements and legal action. 164  
Professor Bill Eskridge has explored the relationship as it applies to 
constitutional law, with a particular focus on gender and race movements, 
as well as the development of social change in the area of sexual 
orientation.165  In his classic work on the pay equity movement, Michael 
McCann demonstrated how legal actions can energize social movements 
resulting in significant political progress even when those legal actions 
ultimately fail, as they typically did in the context of the comparable worth 
movement he studied.166  Within antidiscrimination law, three areas where 
substantial progress has been made over the last few decades – sexual 
orientation, sexual harassment and affirmative action – all had parallel 
social movements that supported the development of an effective legal 
strategy.167  Social change, Eskridge and others have concluded, requires 
both legal action and a coherent social movement.168 
                                                 
     163  Much of the social movement literature focuses on how social movements arise 
and are sustained.  I am interested in the slightly different question of the interrelation 
between social movements and legal action in promoting social change.  For an overview 
of the social movement literature and its relevance to legal change see Edward L. Rubin, 
Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1 (2001); see also NICK CROSSLEY, MAKING SENSE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
(2002) (exploring sociological theories on creating and sustaining social movements) .    
     164  See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of 
Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1489 (2005) (“Nineteenth and twentieth-
century social movement history . . . counsel that law and social movements are 
fundamentally in tension.  They teach that social movements attain leverage in the 
political and legal processes by engaging in disruptive protest action taken outside 
institutionalized political structures; that legal and political change are codependent, but 
that influence runs from politics to law; and that law can both harm and help social 
movements in unintended ways.”).  
     165 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on 
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2405-06 (2002); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001). 
     166  See MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE 
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994).  
     167   I am obviously painting with a wide brush, and will leave this thought 
undeveloped while providing an illustration.  With sexual harassment, the country 
experienced an important public discussion in the context of the Clarence Thomas 
hearings.  Those hearings, and the public discussion, led to important legislative changes 
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 The experience with the ADA supports this emerging claim, as the 
lack of an effective social movement influenced both the development of 
the original legislation and its subsequent interpretation.  With greater 
social pressure, Congress may have drafted more specific legislation, or at 
least addressed some of the imminent issues more clearly, such as the 
question of mitigating measures or the potential conflict with workers’ 
compensation laws.  It is also possible that a coherent movement would 
have arrived at a more specific definition of disability, rather than one that 
could accommodate any or all conditions.  A social movement devoted to 
increasing public awareness about disabilities and the many ways in which 
our society is constructed based on a limited norm of ability might also 
have affected the normative vision the Supreme Court brought to its 
interpretive task.  In contrast, it was unrealistic to expect to alter the very 
definition of disability by simple legislative action, just as it was 
unrealistic to expect the Supreme Court to allow the Suttons to go forward 
with their claim as a way of protecting other more deserving claims.  
Instead, as this case study demonstrates, the Supreme Court remains 
steeped in an outdated notion of disability, one that emphasizes limitations 
rather than abilities and sees the disabled as deserving of protection rather 
than independence.   
  
Too frequently we think of the Supreme Court as apart from, or 
above, broader social norms or movements, even though we are repeatedly 
reminded that the Court most commonly mimics rather than transforms 
social norms.  As Robert Post has recently written regarding constitutional 
decisions, courts work “within the web of cultural understandings that it 
shares with the society that it serves.”169  This is not to say that courts 
cannot influence society or prevailing social norms, but rather the 
influence typically works in both directions, as was particularly apparent 
in the recent battle over affirmative action.  In the University of Michigan 
cases, there seems little question that the amicus briefs filed by elite 
universities and powerful figures had a profound effect on the Court’s 
ultimate determination, just as the Court’s approval of affirmative action 
in Bakke influenced elite public opinion.170  But when the work of social 
change is left exclusively to the courts, advocates are almost certain to be 
disappointed in the ultimate results. 
                                                                                                                                                 
– the damage provisions added to Title VII were a direct result of the lack of remedies for 
many claims of sexual harassment under the equitable remedies model.  Sexual 
harassment claims thereafter increased dramatically, as did business concern and judicial 
attention.  As a result, many like Yale Professor Vicki Schultz now claim that sexual 
harassment law has gone too far in ridding sexuality from the workplace.  See Vicki 
Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003).         
     168  Eskridge, supra note 165, at 2406-07. 
     169  Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, 
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 77 (2003).  
     170  See Brown-Nagin, supra note 164, at 1526. 
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This is not to say that there has not been an important disability 
rights movement that has made a significant social impact.  In the early 
1970s, the Independent Living movement proved extremely successful in 
deinstitutionalizing many of those who lived with disabilities but were 
capable of living outside of an institutional setting.171  The next decade 
saw the emergence of ADAPT, which focused on the inaccessibility of 
public transportation and engaged in various protests around the country 
designed to highlight that inaccessibility. 172   The protests centered at 
Gallaudet University succeeded in producing a deaf President for the first 
time in the school’s history and last Fall student protests again prompted 
the board to alter its Presidential choice.173   All of these movements, 
however, were limited in their focus and none sought to expand the 
definition or concept of disability; in fact, all were centered around 
traditional disabilities.   Equally important to the future of the ADA, none 
of the movements sought to integrate workplace issues into the protests 
and none spawned a broader or sustained group that could carry on the 
work beyond the targeted issues. 
 
 In the end, without a broader social movement pushing to alter the 
public consciousness of disability, there was simply no reason to expect 
that the Supreme Court would interpret the statute expansively and many 
reasons to expect that they would do so narrowly.  Many of the difficult 
interpretive issues surrounding what constitutes a disability involve 
contested social meanings, and, as noted previously, it seems that the 
Supreme Court has tracked public opinion in defining the scope of the 
ADA.  In order to transform our definition of disability, it is necessary 
first – or at least simultaneously -- to alter the public imagination.  Courts 
can assist in that effort but they cannot do all the work.   
 
V. CONCLUSION. 
 
The first decade of experience under the ADA provides important 
lessons for the way in which we think about the power and limits of courts.  
The Supreme Court has interpreted the ADA narrowly, but as discussed 
extensively above, those interpretations were both predictable and appear 
consistent with the reigning definition of disability.  The statute’s effort to 
transform that definition, to transform our imagination, has largely failed, 
even though we have made significant progress on many disability issues.  
Many might be critical of the legislative nature of the Court’s actions – but 
those actions were likewise inevitable, particularly when confronted with a 
                                                 
     171   See SCOTCH, supra note 26, at 49-60 (tracing history of Independent Living 
Movement). 
     172   See, e.g., Irving Kenneth Zola, We Overcame: The Story of Civil Rights for 
Disabled People, 21 POLICY STUDIES J. 802 (1993) (review essay discussing role of 
ADAPT); SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 127-29 (highlighting importance of ADAPT 
protests).     
                   173  See note 75 supra. 
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poorly drafted statute and a disinterested Congress.  Whether the Court has 
been engaged in a strategic game with Congress to enforce its own 
preferences is a difficult conclusion to draw.  It is, however, relatively 
easy to conclude that the Court’s decisions are not the product of any 
particular theory of interpretation.  It is also likely that what the Supreme 
Court has done has been fully consistent with Congressional expectations, 
assuming those expectations were to provide protections for those 
traditionally defined as disabled without significantly transforming that 
definition.  This is obviously substantially less than what the disability 
advocates had envisioned, or what they might argue Congress enacted, but 
without a broader social movement, without broader public involvement in 
the legislative process, the statute the Court has reconstructed may be the 
best we can expect.  
